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Canadian Armed Forces Organizational Change

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Major Andrew Jewer

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Abstract

This research paper seeks to demonstrate that current Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) culture change initiatives are conducive to organizational change; however, to become lasting, policies and approaches must be further adapted to include more sub-cultures within the CAF. This paper first defines CAF organizational cultures through the works of English, Schein, Pedersen and Sorensen, and Pheysey. It then elaborates upon some CAF culture change initiatives after defining major elements of CAF organizational culture as described through outsider observations such as the Somalia Inquiry, Justice Deschamps External Review, and Justice Arbour External Review. Using these observations as a start point it evaluates CAF culture change initiatives against influence on CAF organizational culture through normative, regulative, and cultural-cognitive influences to determine if current change initiatives are conducive to lasting organizational change. The methodology of study also includes informal consultations with the Canadian Defence Academy, departments of Chief Professional Conduct and Culture, Chief Military Personnel, and first-hand observations of CAF culture through the authors 18 years of service within the organization.

This paper identifies that though initiatives are conducive to change, room still remains for CAF leadership and those managing organizational change to further address the start-state militarized masculinity through educational initiatives. It identifies areas to focus such as: change fatigue; change cynicism; the role and presence of leadership; credibility, trust and subsequent reflection on externally or internally-led culture evaluation and change; and education as the cornerstone to cultural-cognitive influence. The paper identifies three areas for further study: evaluating systems and ideals sacred to the membership within the CAF such as discipline; encouraging diversity in thought through professional development and education

outside the confines of military systems; and evaluating how GBA+ is applied to CAF planning, specifically at the operational level.

CANADIAN ARMED FORCES ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE: CULTURE AND LASTING CHANGE

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

Changing an organizations culture is feasible but difficult, because assumptions, the deepest level of culture are unconscious "nonconfrontable and nondebatable."

— Allan D. English *Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective*

In 2004, Allan English, a retired officer of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and senior research fellow at the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, was asked to compare and evaluate the Canadian military organization alongside that of the US military. Though the CAF is now almost two decades older, many of the observations of the CAF used to compare it to the US military still hold true. At the centre of any organization is its culture, and the CAF is no exception to this rule. At its rudimentary level, organizational culture defines membership to an organization.¹ For a volunteer organization such as the CAF to remain relevant, its organizational culture must be representative of the diverse cultures that make up Canadian society. Otherwise, the CAF will no longer be relevant to the people who democratically elect the government it serves and recruiting from society will become more difficult. However, many obstacles complicate any attempt at organizational change: gaps between policy makers and executors; rapid turnover in leadership; the idea that "like tends to promote like in the officer hierarchy;"² and the continuous struggle of a military culture in "crisis" with various reports over the last three decades recommending changes to CAF culture.³ Are these problems a staggering realization indicative of a military that does not embrace organizational change? Or perhaps the

¹ Peter A. Schein and Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership 5th ed*, (New York: Wiley, 2017), 6.

² Allan D. English, *Understanding Military Culture : A Canadian Perspective*, (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004): 29. <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/cfvlibrary-ebooks/detail.action?docID=3330644>

³ Further elaborated in chapter three, this paper draws from the 1995 Somalia Inquiry report, 2015 Deschamps report, 2022 Heyder-Beattie settlement final recommendations and the 2022 Arbour report.

CAF as a military organization and its associated culture is not conducive to encouraging change and constant cultural evolution?

Over the last few years, a number of criminal investigations into CAF senior leaders to include the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)⁴ have brought the question of CAF culture to the forefront of priorities for the CAF. Towards the end of fall 2021, the Joint Command and Staff Program (JCSP) course serial 48, of which the author is a member, participated in military training in Ottawa. Here a common theme was identified throughout the briefings of senior military leaders; the CAF must address its cultural issues and how it treats its members. This paper will analyze current CAF culture change initiatives in an organizational change context, using a framework based on the well-known models of authors such as English⁵ and Schein.⁶ The author will draw on the situation provided by the recent Heyder-Beattie class action lawsuit subject matter expert analysis⁷ and reports by Retired Justice Marie Deschamps,⁸ Retired Justice Louise Arbour,⁹ and the Somalia Inquiry.¹⁰ Through these models and context, this paper will demonstrate that current CAF culture change initiatives are conducive to organizational change;

⁴ Murray Brewster, “Case against former top General Jonathan Vance adjourned until October,” CBC news, last accessed 28 April 2022. <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/jonathan-vance-obstruction-justice-armed-forces-1.6178970>

⁵ Allan D. English, *Understanding Military Culture ...*,

⁶ Peter A. Schein and Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture ...*,

⁷ Maya Eichler, “*Redesigning the CAF workplace to enable culture change.*” *Consultations for Gender Representation and Diversity, Final Summary Report 2021*, (draft paper); Grazia Scoppio, “If you build it, they will come: (re)building an inclusive, diverse, equitable and accountable Canadian Military through education,” *Consultations for Gender Representation and Diversity, Final Summary Report 2021*, (draft paper); and Nancy Taber, “Eliminating unearned privilege: Problematizing the warrior ideal embedded in recruitment, retention, and promotion policies and practices,” *Consultations for Gender Representation and Diversity, Final Summary Report 2021*, (draft paper).

⁸ Marie Deschamps [External Review Authority], External review into sexual misconduct and sexual harassment in the Canadian Armed Forces, (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2015).

⁹ Louise Arbour [External Review Authority], *Report of the Independent External Comprehensive Review of the DND and the CAF*, (Ottawa : Department of National Defence, 2022).

¹⁰ Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, *Dishonoured legacy: the lessons of the Somalia Affair: report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia*, (Ottawa, 1997).

however, to become lasting, policies and approaches must be further adapted to include more sub-cultures within the CAF.

It is perhaps apparent that organizational change is not as simple as deploying troops to the Baltics in support of Canada's NATO commitments. Some would perhaps easily define culture as the sum of values, beliefs, and attitudes. However, it is much more complicated in practice as organizational culture influences and is influenced by those unwritten rules, opinions, and actions within an organization.¹¹ These unwritten rules can be amplified by organizations known to have a firm reliance on traditions and that have little influence on its members from outsiders.¹² The CAF is one such organization, rooted in tradition and in complete control over its policies, training, education, and personnel selection. Current initiatives that aim to simply change doctrine, encourage new ideas through the completion of online courses, or have discussions between like-minded people is a beginning; however the sum impact of initiatives must change the underlying assumptions of its members to ensure change. Equally as important is the concept that organizational change through compliance, conformity, and creativity stems from influence on the regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive planes.¹³ The author posits that though culture change initiatives may reach across all aspects of the organization, not including or at a minimum not addressing the values of the militarized masculine majority will create tensions, cynicism, and resistance to the necessary organizational change of the CAF. If

¹¹ Allan D. English, *Understanding Military Culture ...*, 10-11.

¹² *ibid*, 25-29.

¹³ Vanessa Brown and Allan Okros, "Shifting the Spotlight: Institutional and Structural Contributors to Unprofessional Conduct in the Military" in *Team Diversity and Inclusion in Defence and Security: International Perspectives*, ed. B. Waruszynski, Y. Yanakiev, and D. McDonald, (Springer International Publishing, in press), 11-12.

CAF leadership decides to add values to encourage diversity in gender and race, they may not survive without first addressing militarized masculinity and its values.

To achieve this paper's aim, the author will first set the stage in Chapter two by providing a foundation of cultural terminology as it applies to the military organization. This chapter will also briefly summarize the current definitions and history behind the CAF culture as defined by its ethos. Chapter two will conclude with a breakdown of the organizational change framework used by Allan English in his 2004 analysis of the CAF. Aspects of English's framework will be built upon and adapted to inform this paper's analysis of CAF culture. To better adapt the framework to address organizational change, the concepts of trust and confidence will be added as a unifying element to the different elements of English's framework.

Chapter three will begin by exploring the various influences on culture through the regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive planes, resulting in shaping beliefs, ideas, and behaviours. Following the explanation of influence strategies, this chapter will explore the history of cultural difficulties in the CAF through a brief analysis of the Somalia report,¹⁴ Deschamps's external review,¹⁵ Heyder-Beattie final summary report subject matter expert recommendations,¹⁶ and the external review by Justice Arbour.¹⁷ This history will serve three purposes: first, to identify trends over the last three decades, second, to inform leadership on areas that may be of importance in chapter four, and third, to identify areas of culture that may not have been adequately influenced over the years. This third chapter will then conclude by

¹⁴ Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, *Dishonoured legacy...*,

¹⁵ Marie Deschamps [External Review Authority], External review into sexual misconduct ...,

¹⁶ Maya Eichler, "Redesigning the CAF workplace ..."; Grazia Scoppio, "If you build it, they will come: ..."; and Nancy Taber, "Eliminating unearned privilege...."

¹⁷ Louise Arbour [External Review Authority], *Report of the Independent....*

outlining some key initiatives before concluding with a deep dive on CAF learning, guided by the Canadian Defence Academy's (CDA) culture change framework.¹⁸

Chapter four begins by applying the change model and organizational change influence strategies to current initiatives to determine if any aspects of organizational change may have been overlooked. This chapter will continue by identifying essential areas for leadership to concentrate efforts, namely leadership, credibility, and education. These three areas are based on trends from the analysis of the reports and external reviews outlined in chapter three. Chapter four will then conclude by offering further work and study areas that may add to culture change or enhance existing programs.

Methodology:

The research question, “are CAF organizational change initiatives conducive to lasting change?” generated five different subordinate objectives. First, military culture and its aspects of values, beliefs, and attitudes must be defined. Secondly, the facets to influence said culture must be identified as culture is very much intertwined into every aspect of the CAF; culture, policies, and programs or systems. To properly influence change, initiatives must be categorized into three conceptual ideals that can influence culture: first, regulative change through compliance with rules and policies; second, normative change through conformity to new behaviours; and third, cultural cognitive change through creativity influencing and reinforcing sought after ideas and beliefs. The third subordinate objective, an analysis of current events using class-action lawsuits, external reviews and official reports on the CAF, must be used to inform the path taken to arrive at today's culture, and therefore the start point of culture change initiatives. Fourth,

¹⁸ Canadian Defence Academy, “CDA Culture Change Framework FY22/23 to FY23/24: CAF PD System Support to Culture Change,” (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, 2022).

current culture change initiatives must be identified and elaborated upon through consultation with the CAF Chief Professional Conduct and Culture (CPCC), the CDA, and published key initiatives within the CAF's Chief Military Personnel (CMP). Finally, an organizational change framework must be identified to analyze initiatives against the CAF's organizational culture. This framework will draw on the 2004 works of English, where the sum of sub-cultures defines an organization's culture, which is defined as chaotic in nature – reacting to its environment. Cultures are also defined by their values-in-use vice their ideal values which are provided by doctrine for the CAF.

The author, as an 18 year serving member of the CAF, will provide examples of CAF culture from his personal experience as a member of the defense establishment. The author considers himself to be socialized into the CAF organizational culture, and therefore his observations are those of an insider. Beyond consultation with various CAF departments and the author's personal experience, primary research was determined to be beyond the scope and timeframe allotted for this research paper. However, such research could prove helpful to inform CAF organizational change in the future as the requirement of CAF culture to adapt to an ever-changing environment will be constant. Another aspect of organizational culture is the "Fit" perspective, or the appropriateness of proposed changes in CAF culture compared to the organization's strategy. This appropriateness leads to a debate on how Canada defines its soldiers versus what is required of them during times of conflict or war. This debate is best reserved for the sphere of the Canadian public and its government and is therefore not addressed in this paper. The requirement for change will not be disputed and is considered an assumption, and the ideal culture sought of the CAF is defined as the values identified in CAF Ethos doctrine, to be discussed in detail through chapter two.

CHAPTER 2 DEFINITIONS AND FRAMEWORK

“Instead of being certain, be curious.”

— Anonymous

Prior to elaborating on the current situation of the CAF, including the events that led to the current focus on CAF culture, and evaluating the subsequent actions of the CAF, certain definitions and a framework of study must be elaborated. Since there exists a plethora of opinions and definitions regarding culture, this chapter will first explain the building blocks of culture.¹⁹ These building blocks are based heavily on the works of Swiss-American psychologist Edgar Schein. Schein, a recognized expert in the field of organizational culture and psychology, has published over a dozen books on the subject since 1965. Following this definition of organizational culture, this chapter will then elaborate on this paper’s chosen organizational change framework, based on the works of Allan English. English, a retired Royal Canadian Air Force officer who was contracted to study the Americanisation of CAF culture in his 2004 book *Understanding Military Culture – A Canadian Perspective*,²⁰ provides a framework adapted to study the elements of Canadian military culture. The author will then build on English’s framework by adding in the concepts of trust and confidence in the organization, since they are prerequisite to any changes being accepted. The chapter will then continue to provide insight into the evolution of CAF organizational culture through its ethos statements, including the yet-to-be-published “*Trusted to Serve*.”²¹ The author will then build on this image of CAF culture, using the works of Drs Vanessa Brown and Allan Okros, researchers in the field of sociology of the

¹⁹ Peter A. Schein and Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*..., 3-5.

²⁰ Allan D. English, *Understanding Military Culture* ...,

²¹ Department of National Defence, *Trusted to Serve*, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, in press).

military and organizational psychology respectively. Their works will assist the discussion of the profession of arms and nuances of its culture not adequately explained in the first section.

In the study of culture, one thing is certain and agreed upon by experts across the domains of anthropology, psychology, and sociology; no cookie-cutter nor common point of view exists for all studies.²² The definition and elements that build culture depend on the studied environment and the circumstances of their study. The perspectives of researchers, such as insiders or outsiders, are essential to provide context for the findings of studies.²³ Insiders can more easily understand the context of the elements they study and tend to be more credible within the organization. Outsiders are more objective but often have less comprehension of the inner workings of the organization and are considered less credible to its members.

Section 1 – The Building Blocks Of Culture

In a military sense, retired US Lieutenant General Walter F. Ulmer, and 65th Commandant of Cadets at the US Army College West Point, explained culture as the "bedrock of military effectiveness."²⁴ However, as Ulmer also states, "to put military culture (...) into context, however, we must look beyond it."²⁵ Military culture could be considered a counterculture to mainstream western culture; mainstream culture encourages individuality and freedom, while perhaps ironically, the military that serves the public encourages self-sacrifice for the greater good. However, even if one defines military culture as a counterculture, the building blocks are the same. The following section will break culture down into its different aspects, first

²² *Ibid.*,

²³ John Steckley, *Elements of Sociology, 5th ed.* (Oxford University Press, Canada, 2020), 39.

²⁴ Ulmer *et al*, *American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century*, (CSIS international security program, Washington, D.C. 2000), xv.

²⁵ *Ibid.*,

into the basics of assumptions and behaviours, and then elaborate into Schein's cultural analysis framework.²⁶

From a perspective based on sociology, this paper defines culture as "a social system (sometimes contested) comprising behaviour, beliefs, knowledge, practices, values, and material such as buildings, tools and sacred items."²⁷ Organizational culture will be defined later in section two as part of this paper's framework, however it can be briefly defined as the culture specific to an organization, comprising of the behaviours, beliefs, values and assumptions held by its members. These parts of culture do not exist independently; they are interconnected, though some may have more significant influences than others. An example of important interaction is the sum of values and beliefs that influence attitudes, which in turn influence behaviour.²⁸ All four of these elements – beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviours – are essential to inform this study since varying perspectives and definitions exist.

First, values and beliefs must be elaborated upon since they are the building blocks for attitudes and behaviours. A definition of values of an organization is the "broad preference concerning appropriate course of action or outcomes."²⁹ Organizational beliefs are "assumed facts about the world that do not involve evaluation" by group members.³⁰ Next, attitudes, or "a fairly stable emotional tendency, to respond consistently to some object, situation, person, or category of people,"³¹ are influenced by both these values and beliefs; how an organization reacts is dependent on what they see as appropriate and their assumptions of the world around them.

²⁶ Peter A. Schein and Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership...*, 17-21.

²⁷ John Steckley, *Elements of Sociology*, 5th ed. ..., 497.

²⁸ Allan D. English, *Understanding Military Culture ...*, 12.

²⁹ *ibid.*, 12-13.

³⁰ *Ibid.*,

³¹ *Ibid.*,

Looking towards the Canadian military, combining the values loyalty, duty, and courage³² with the organizational belief in the CAF's role³³ to serve the Canadian public generates the attitude that CAF members must follow the directives of the Government of Canada at all cost, to include self sacrifice.

Merriam-Webster defines behaviours as "the response of an individual, group or species to its environment."³⁴ In the CAF, a soldier's behaviour is influenced and directed by the group's attitudes; either good behaviour where the soldier unequivocally follows orders without question or poor behaviour where the soldier becomes insubordinate, questions the directives given by superiors, and refuses to comply. The ideas of good and poor behaviour are also social constructs based on the larger CAF Culture, and arguably forged over centuries of warfighting, since poor behaviour on the battlefield could result in casualties or mission failure. Behaviours are also not required to be entirely binary across all different sub-cultures or even within a particular sub-culture. An example, linked to the questioning of orders, can be found in the air force, where aviators are encouraged to be inquisitive of matters regarding safety; a reality that seemed foreign to the author when first introduced to the concept while conducting training as a Joint Terminal Attack Controller.³⁵

These four elements define a culture; however, Edward Schein's model dives deeper into organizational culture, vice culture in more general terms, and offers three different levels of analysis; 1) artifacts, 2) espoused beliefs and values, and 3) underlying basic assumptions (figure

³² Department of National Defence, *Trusted to Serve...*, 15-20.


³³ Department of National Defence, *Strong Secure Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2017), 82.

³⁴ Merriam-Webster Dictionary, "Behaviour definition and Meaning," last accessed 10 march 2022. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/behavior>

³⁵ Joint Terminal Attack Controllers are military members who synchronize and deconflict attack vectors of aircraft with ground manoeuvre. They are the link between army ground operations and supporting aircraft.

2.1).³⁶ Each of these three interact with each other and leave their mark on group members.

Starting with artifacts and ending with assumptions, these levels of analysis, and their subsequent



impact on culture, are increasingly complex and challenging to define. Also, artifacts tend to be more visible to observers of the group, while basic assumptions are much more difficult to initially observe by outsiders.³⁷

Figure 2.1 – Schein's culture definition as interpreted by the author
 Source: Edgar H. Schein; *Organizational culture and leadership*, 5th ed, 17-25

Artifacts, the level of analysis that is the easiest to observe, are "the phenomena that you would see, hear, and feel when you encounter a new group."³⁸ These include, but are not limited to, phenomena such as language – to include jargon, a vital part in any military – clothing or uniforms, myths or stories, and published doctrine.³⁹ In the case of the CAF, any outsider could characterize the surface of its organizational culture by stating that soldiers employ a language laced with acronyms and jargon, are uniform in how they dress and have an inherently aggressive or warfighting culture. Though acronyms and jargon are present in everyday military culture, uniformity in dress and the aggressive culture could be based on assumptions drawn from Hollywood films and the news. Depending on which sub-culture of the CAF is observed, these assumptions have varying levels of accuracy.

³⁶ Peter A. Schein and Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*..., 17-25.

³⁷ *Ibid.*,

³⁸ *Ibid.*,

³⁹ Allan D. English, *Understanding Military Culture* ..., 18-19.

The definition of individual beliefs and values begins as an "individual's own assumptions about what is right and what is wrong."⁴⁰ The beliefs and values of a group or culture are what the strongest leaders of said group instil in the organization and become globally known as right and wrong.⁴¹ The sum of these groups becomes the organizations beliefs and values. If members of the group decide not to accept these values, they may be excommunicated. In an oversimplified military example, if a member of an eight-person section decides to deviate from the interests of the group in favour of their own, they would tend to be included less in group discussions or meetings. This member could also face official or non-official corrective measures from the section leadership, such as remedial tasks to reinforce the group values or administrative and disciplinary actions to ensure compliance.

Finally, underlying basic assumptions are the solutions to problems and opinions that have become so ingrained in the organization's psyche that they are automatic and seldomly challenged.⁴² These solutions become the preferred response within a group, and are accepted to a point such that little to no deviation can be observed within the social unit.⁴³ In the case of the CAF, an underlying basic assumption could be the "service before self but always cover your (backside)" mantra that is nowhere to be found in doctrine but is constantly repeated by experienced members in the organization. This mantra encourages members to always look out for their own aspirations and ensure that direction is provided in a written format in the event that someone else disputes their actions. In 2003, the author enrolled in the primary reserve; the first lesson he experienced during his basic training was from the course's senior non-commissioned officer, centred on this idea, but provided in a more explicit format, termed the

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*,

⁴¹ *Ibid.*,

⁴² Peter A. Schein and Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership...*, 21.

⁴³ *Ibid.*,

CYA principle or “Cover your (backside).” This underscores the importance of this principle within the socialization into the organization; the first formal lesson given by the senior non-commissioned member of this course was not linked to doctrine but an unofficial principle of having a written record of orders to ensure that nobody could change their mind.

Some experts have argued that CAF culture is extremely sexualized, masculine, and desensitized compared to Canadian Culture.⁴⁴ Though varying between individuals, the onboarding process and socialization of members is generally very rapid, beginning when recruits and officer cadets arrive at basic training. As an example, the author recalls some of his first experiences on officer basic training when he transferred to the regular force in 2004. The author reported to a civilian friend that he was beaten during a morning inspection, referring to a tough inspection and not physical altercation. However, his friend took it literally and asked if it was still normal for soldiers to be beaten. Though the author, with prior service in the reserves, had been a member of the CAF for over a year at this point, similar desensitized language was employed by others on the course who had only a month worth of service. This desensitization can be observed in regular conversations and was a theme in the 2015 Deschamps report.⁴⁵ It is an example of basic assumptions that inform espoused values and beliefs as well as underlying assumptions that define the informal CAF culture to be further developed later in this chapter.

⁴⁴ Vanessa Brown and Allan Okros, “Disrupting Social Constructions in the Profession of Arms,” in *Rethinking Military Professionalism for the Changing Armed Forces*, ed. K. Hachey, T. Libel, W. Dean, (Springer, Cham. 2020) 152-153; Christina Masters, “Bodies of Technology: Cyborg Soldiers and Militarized Masculinities,” *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 7, no. 1 (2005): 117.

⁴⁵ Marie Deschamps [External Review Authority], *External review into sexual misconduct and sexual harassment in the Canadian Armed Forces*, (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2015), 18.

Section 2: Organizational Change Framework

In 2004, English was asked to evaluate whether the CAF was becoming too "Americanised;" his book *Understanding Military Culture* was his response. In this book he creates a melting pot of different authors and perspectives on culture to build a framework through which to study the CAF and US military services. This paper's framework goes beyond the analysis of culture and incorporates the analysis of organizational culture since it "is far more than (myths, traditions, rituals and food). It is pervasive and critically important in understanding how all organizations work."⁴⁶ Therefore, this section will first elaborate on English's definition of organizational culture and then provide a change framework using his model as a start point. Though English's model encompasses many aspects of CAF culture, it does not place enough emphasis on the works of Pedersen and Sorensen, researchers in the field of Organizational culture, theory, and transformation. This study seeks to further explore their perspectives, notably that cultures are dominated by "differentiation, inconsistency, ambiguity, and conflict instead of a dominant, cohesive culture."⁴⁷

English defines organizational culture as the collection of values, beliefs, and attitudes, which provide members of the group with a standard way of interpreting events.⁴⁸ In the case of the CAF, both society and the draft CAF ethos doctrine, "*Trusted to serve*," state that members should adhere to its ethos or its guiding beliefs.⁴⁹ Therefore, once published, this ethos will be taken as the organizational culture statement of the CAF, transferring from the definition currently provided by existing doctrine, *Duty With Honour*. However, one thing that is important

⁴⁶ Allan D. English, *Understanding Military Culture* ..., 14.

⁴⁷ *ibid*, 20.

⁴⁸ *ibid*, 14-15.

⁴⁹ Department of National Defence. *Trusted to Serve*..., 2.

to understand in the analysis of culture is the history and from where the culture evolved; "If learning is shared, all the group forces of identity formation and cohesion come into play in stabilizing that learning because it comes to define for the group who we are and what is our purpose."⁵⁰ To understand CAF ethos and how members will adopt it, one must look to the history and learning process' of the CAF; this will be established further in chapter three through the presentation and analysis of the various reports on CAF culture over the last three decades and a deep dive on CAF learning. CAF Ethos is developed further in section three.

A culture's strength draws from the length of time, stability of the organization's members, and the intensity of shared learning experiences. This strength is amplified by the group's members' interactions with their surroundings, both within and outside the organization. The latter, interactions outside of the organization, is an essential aspect of organizational culture as nothing exists in isolation.⁵¹ The connection between cultures is observed through the rightful influence of Canadian culture on CAF organizational culture. A volunteer military must reflect the society from which its members originate and therefore the CAF must be a reflection of Canadian society to ensure continuing support from the society it serves.

The first aspect of this framework of organizational culture and change is based on the works of Schein. Schein's work will assist this model in analyzing how the CAF learns as an organization. To determine the direction and depth of organizational change, one must look to the cultures and sub-cultures within the organization.⁵² Regarding the CAF, its culture is demonstrated through the sum of many different sub-cultures, from subcultures based on race to each element, to the regular force, and to the reserve force among others. The commonalities

⁵⁰ Peter A. Schein and Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership...*, 6.

⁵¹ *ibid*, 15.

⁵² Allan D. English, *Understanding Military Culture ...*, 17.

between these sub-cultures are the link for policies to be far-reaching; if certain sub-cultures are not incorporated in organizational change initiatives or planning, then parts of the organization will remain unchanged; “achieving organizational integration requires understanding sub-cultures and designing intergroup processes to allow communication and collaboration across sometimes strong subcultural boundaries.”⁵³ Though evaluations and studies of each sub-culture are beyond this paper's scope, organizational change initiatives will be addressed in chapter four for their ability to span across various CAF sub-cultures.

Schein also emphasizes the role that leadership plays in an organization, providing examples of how leadership creates culture and must be present during all stages of growth of an organization.⁵⁴ The importance of leadership is elaborated further in chapter three since leadership has become a recurring theme in the recent reports and consultations regarding CAF culture.⁵⁵ In this paper's context, a leader could be someone officially charged with the responsibilities of commanding personnel or someone who gathers and influences those around them naturally without an official mandate or position traditionally associated with leadership. Senior leaders are defined as those senior officers, non commissioned officers, and civilians who guide the CAF from the top of the military hierarchy. At the time of his basic training, the author recalls the principles of leadership as an essential element of training for all officers proceeding through basic officer training at the recruit and leadership school in St. Jean, Quebec. The principle “lead by example” sits at the top of the list, and is perhaps the most important when

⁵³ *Ibid.*,

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*,

⁵⁵ Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, *Dishonoured legacy*; Marie Deschamps [External Review Authority], *External review...*; and Louise Arbour [External Review Authority], *Report of the Independent...*,

regarding culture. Therefore, the examples set by both official and unofficial leaders and their place in the military cannot be understated.

The second aspect of this framework is based on the works of Pedersen and Sorensen. Contrary to many experts, they argue that organizational culture is not governed completely by cultural paradigms. Instead, they argue that the basic assumptions and the coherent cultural paradigms are the attempts of analysts to fit round pegs into round holes.⁵⁶ They opine that order does not exist and organizational cultures are not required to be coherent, consistent, and rational.⁵⁷ Furthermore, they differentiate between Schein's espoused values and their term "values-in-use," or values that guide organizational behaviour. These values-in-use can demonstrate how an organizational culture could cause unpredictable interactions and reactions with new elements introduced into the organization's environment.

Regarding organizational change, Pedersen and Sorensen opine that some members of the organization may never actually change their culture.⁵⁸ English takes this concept and uses it to explain higher periods of turnover, where members lose their place within the organization.⁵⁹ In the case of the CAF and military culture, a member with more than 20 years of experience who decides to leave the CAF, cannot be easily replaced without creating gaps at each echelon below that person. This cyclical nature of a hierarchical culture such as the CAF can aid in long-term cultural change, depending on the efficacy of socialization into the group. More experienced generations who leave the group allow newer generations to replace them, thus influencing the overall culture if these newer generations bring a difference in values. In an organization such as

⁵⁶ Jesper Strandgaard Pedersen, *Organizational Cultures in Theory and Practice*, (Aldershot: Avebury, 1989), 21.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*,

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁵⁹ Allan D. English, *Understanding Military Culture ...*, 21.

the CAF, this could explain why organizational change is often slow; the older generations are often those who lead the organization, and those who lead the strong socialization process. When successors are chosen, leaders often naturally look to people who possess similar values and beliefs to those they replace, or the “like promotes like” concept.⁶⁰ For change to be rapid, these experienced generations must change their way of thinking and expand their culture to accept external values, an inherently difficult task, or cede their place in the organization to others. Pedersen and Sorensen also opine that the varied sub-cultures are more dominant than the significant corporate culture since members act more on the values and beliefs of their sub-culture than those of the organizational culture writ large.⁶¹ As a demonstration of this phenomenon, the author offers the idea of “regimental culture” which is found within the Canadian Army. This “regimental culture” is perhaps best described by the observations of the Somalia Report.⁶² These observations speak to a specific sub-culture which arguably still exists through various formal and informal processes such as regimental or corps senates and how members of units are succession planned and groomed for future positions. Within this regimental system, those of a particular unit are more likely to trust other members than an outsider, since they share common traditions and ‘roots’ with their regimental colleagues than those from other regiments.

The third aspect of the organizational culture framework can be found in the works of Diana Pheysey, a Research fellow at the University of Aston, Birmingham, England, and the author of *Organizational Cultures*.⁶³ Pheysey's work is directed toward the international and multicultural dimensions that reside within an organization. English opines that these elements "will become increasingly relevant to Canadian military professionals both from the perspective

⁶⁰ Allan D. English, *Understanding Military Culture ...*,29

⁶¹ *Ibid*, 20.

⁶² Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, *Dishonoured legacy...*,124.

⁶³ Diana C. Pheysey, *Organizational Cultures: Types and Transformations*, (London; New York; Routledge, 1993).

of multinational operations and, perhaps more importantly, from the perspective of this country's changing demographics due to immigration."⁶⁴ Business researchers have identified that multiculturalism allows for diverse perspectives and solutions to business problems, through connectionism, or "how culture shapes the way people think."⁶⁵ The intersection of national culture and CAF organizational culture cannot be understated. As Canadian culture grows and evolves, CAF culture should follow. The current reality, where culture experienced on the day to day by members appears to be disconnected from the high standards of doctrine,⁶⁶ could be due to the inherent hierarchy of the CAF where those leading are products of CAF socialization spanning decades of service. The socialization of CAF members is therefore led by those who are already socialized into the CAF, and who are already desensitized to what would be typically deemed unacceptable to the average Canadian, such as the use of sexualized language.⁶⁷ The passing of values then becomes cyclic in nature.

Pheyse also offers four different types of cultures and four types of organizational cultures (Table 2.1). It is important to note that no one organization or group fits categorically in a single type; like much in the studies of anthropology or sociology, these cultures are products of interactions with both internal and external factors.⁶⁸ As such cultures evolve over time and may exhibit traits of two or more cultural types. Of particular interest is that a hierarchical organization such as the CAF where planning plays a vital role; all the operations orders and

⁶⁴ Allan D. English, *Understanding Military Culture ...*, 17.

⁶⁵ Gundula Lücke, Tatiana Kostova, and Kendall Roth, "Multiculturalism from a Cognitive Perspective: Patterns and Implications." *Journal of International Business Studies* 45, no. 2 (Feb, 2014): 171. <https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/multiculturalism-cognitive-perspective-patterns/docview/1497999297/se-2?accountid=9867>.

⁶⁶ Marie Deschamps [External Review Authority], *External review...*, i – iii.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 14-15.

⁶⁸ Allan D. English, *Understanding Military Culture ...*, 25-26.

directives produced by staff bear the commander's signature, and subordinates are expected to follow those orders and directives.

Table 2.1 – Visualization of Pheysey’s Culture types as interpreted by the Author

Pheysey's Culture types	
1. General Culture types	a. Law-abiding societies that try to reduce uncertainty in their members by regulating behaviour with laws and codes of conduct
	b. Economically competitive societies where individualism is prized
	c. Harmonious societies where cooperation and the minimization of conflict are valued
	d. Powerfully led societies where strong leaders are given wide scope to direct the individuals' activities
2. Organisational culture types	a. Role cultures which are often large hierarchical organizations where conformity to superiors' expectations based on a clear articulation of jobs and procedures is emphasized
	b. Achievement cultures, where people resolve their own problems and satisfy their own needs and expectations
	c. Support cultures where all individuals participate in the decision-making process
	d. Power cultures where strong people with high status direct the activities of subordinates who are expected to be compliant and willing

Source: Allan D. English, *Understanding Military Culture, A Canadian Perspective*, 25-26

English’s framework was limited to the three aspects elaborated upon to date as he sought to evaluate CAF culture. This paper must continue beyond defining culture and the impacts of sub-cultures to set the conditions to evaluate change initiatives. The final element that must be considered, and central to the acceptance of any change initiative by the members of the organization is the combination of trust and confidence. Based largely in the works of

organizational behaviour expert Denise M. Rousseau,⁶⁹ the organizational psychology researcher, Ashley Fulmer, defines organizational trust as “a shared psychological state among organizational members comprising willingness to accept vulnerability based on positive expectations of a specific other or others.”⁷⁰ In chapter three, the concept of CAF culture as holding militarized masculine values will be developed and the importance of accepting vulnerability will be shown as crucial to change initiatives. Regarding confidence, the Retired Supreme Court Justice, former United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights and author of the latest external review into CAF culture, Louise Arbour, places the importance of confidence above the need to understand culture in her interim recommendation to the Minister of National Defence (MND).⁷¹ Again to be further discussed in chapter three, the demonstration that the CAF is making efforts to be transparent and that it is seen to be making changes will generate confidence in the organization; without such confidence, trust cannot be maintained and change will be impossible.

A visualization of the essential elements of the framework to be used in this paper is included in figure 2.2. CAF organizational change may prove resistant to change; however, to successfully change this organization, a focus must be placed on the ‘values-in-use,’ the complex cultural mosaic of the forces, the plethora of sub-cultures, and the requirement for initiatives to reach across these sub-cultures. Addressing only one aspect of CAF organizational culture or

⁶⁹ Denise M. Rousseau et al, "Not so Different After all: A Cross-Discipline View of Trust," *Academy of Management Review* 23, no. 3 (07, 1998): 393-404.

<https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/not-so-different-after-all-cross-discipline-view/docview/210973020/se-2?accountid=9867>

⁷⁰ Ashley C. Fulmer, and M.J. Gelfand, “At What Level (and in Whom) We Trust: Trust Across Multiple Organizational Levels,” *Journal of Management*, (2012; 38 (4)):1167-1230.

⁷¹ Louise Arbour [External Review Authority], *Interim recommendations from Independent External Comprehensive Review Team*, (Ottawa : Department of National Defence, 2021), 2.

producing initiatives that single out certain sub-cultures within the CAF will not result in the organizational change sought or, at the very least, result in not attaining the rapid change demanded by the society which the CAF serves.




Figure 2.2 – Essential Organizational Change Framework interpreted from English
Source: Allan D. English, *Understanding Military Culture, A Canadian Perspective*

Section 3: Current CAF Culture and Ethos

CAF culture can be broken down into two different cultural ideas, official and the reality, a concept further elaborated by Paul Johnston, an RCAF officer, in his 2000 analysis of doctrine and corporate culture.⁷² The official organizational culture is informed by a soldier's official ideal values, beliefs, and attitudes as guided by CAF doctrine. The creation of CAF ethos is not well documented, the first appearance in doctrine doctrine is *Canadian Forces Publication 300 – Canada's Army*.⁷³ This publication cites various papers regarding ethos from the late 1980s and early 1990s such as *Officership and Professional Ethics*.⁷⁴ John C. Eggenberger, a retired staff officer to the Army Commander in the early eighties, documented the first high level working

⁷² Paul Johnston, "Doctrine is Not enough: The Effect of Doctrine on the Behavior of Armies," *Parameters* 30, no. 3 (Fall, 2000), 30. <https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/doctrine-is-not-enough-effect-on-behavior-armies/docview/1306225947/se-2?accountid=9867>.

⁷³ Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-000 FP-000, *Canada's Army*, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2001), 68-70.

⁷⁴ Karol W.J. Wenek, *Officership and Professional Ethics*, (Kingston, Ont: Dept. of Military Psychology and Leadership, Royal Military College of Canada, 1993).

group and subsequent working document relating to ethos. Known as the “Citadelle document,” it was never officially published.⁷⁵ The second culture is the reality based on the actual values described in the latter two elements of Schein’s organizational culture model; espoused ‘values and beliefs’ and ‘underlying assumptions.’ This unofficial culture will always exist, as it could be explained as the sum of a soldier’s experiences, and its existence is not strictly positive nor negative. However, when these two cultures diverge in a way that the soldier does not respect the written and unwritten rules of society, a competent and professional military can lose the confidence of the public it serves, pushing the organization towards irrelevancy or forcing it to adapt.

This section aims to demonstrate the continuous state of evolution of CAF ethos. Ethos, initially used to describe culture and justify decisions in the CAF in the early 1980s, never officially made its way into doctrine until the late 1990s early 2000s. This section will begin by briefly providing background to ethos as it pertains to the profession of arms within the CAF. It will then provide the current ethos statement from the draft *Trusted to Serve*. This section will conclude by providing some recent observations on CAF military culture by Brown and Okros that fall outside of the ethos; however, they could significantly impact change to CAF organizational culture.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the word ethos was used in many army circles until challenged by a "senior personage in National Defence Headquarters in 1981."⁷⁶ The term ethos was used as justification for everything from socialization methods of soldiers to infrastructure

⁷⁵ John Eggenberger, “Understanding Canadian Army Ethos,” Royal United Services institute of Vancouver Island, last modified 01 November 2004. <https://rusivicda.org/understanding-canadian-army-ethos/#:~:text=%20Understanding%20Canadian%20Army%20Ethos%20%201%20Background,.%E2%80%93%20values%20and%20sentiments%20have%20been...%20More%20>

⁷⁶ Ibid.,

projects such as messes. However, as the senior personage challenged, the ethos was not defined in any document or doctrine within the Army or the CAF. As such, the outgoing commander of the army convened a meeting of officers from the army, navy, and air force at the Citadelle in Quebec City to discuss army ethos. This meeting resulted in what was to be known as the Citadelle document.⁷⁷ The language used in the Citadelle document,⁷⁸ Canadian Forces Publication (CFP) 300 *Canada's Army*⁷⁹ the first officially published doctrine on ethos, and the updated 2009 version of the 2003 ethos document, *Duty with Honour*,⁸⁰ are all very similar. Military Ethos is explained through reference to integrity, service or duty, discipline, courage, and responsibility to name a few. However, *Duty with Honour* never references CFP 300 nor the Citadelle document.⁸¹ Many of the similarities between these documents indicate common inspiration and little change in expectations from a military ethos and professional soldier in the close to 30 years between them. If elements of the CAF ethos remain the same and continue to be independently observed by different authors, then they become essential to defining the CAF and its soldiers' values.

Recently, CAF leadership has directed an update to CAF ethos, resulting in a newer, shorter document named *Trusted To Serve*. This document uses again many of the same values and beliefs that were the foundation of the Citadelle document, CFP 300, and *Duty With Honour*; however, *Trusted to Serve* classifies them under three ethical principles, six values, and eight professional expectations (table 2.2). These 17 elements together are what CAF leadership

⁷⁷ Department of National Defence, "The Citadelle Document," (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1981). <http://rusiviccda.org/the-citadelle-document/>

⁷⁸ Ibid.,

⁷⁹ Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-000 FP-000, *Canada's Army...*, 18-20.

⁸⁰ Department of National Defence, *Duty With Honour*, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2009), 35.

⁸¹ *ibid*, 82-84.

expects of every soldier and serve as the baseline for confronting events or situations around them⁸² and represent the ideal, official CAF culture.

Table 2.2 – CAF Ethos

CAF Ethos		
1. Principles	a. Respect the dignity of all persons	
	b. Serve Canada before self	
	c. Obey and support lawful authority	
2. Values	a. Duty	d. Courage
	b. Loyalty	e. Excellence
	c. Integrity	f. Stewardship
3. Expectations	a. Accepting unlimited liability	e. Teamwork
	b. Perseverance	f. Inclusion
	c. Leadership	g. Readiness
	d. Discipline	h. Accountability

Source: Government of Canada, *Trusted to Serve...*, p13-27.

⁸² Department of National Defence, *Trusted to Serve...*, 13-27.

As stated at the debut of this section, many aspects of culture are not included in official documents. This second culture is influenced by the non-official aspects that inform soldiers experiences as part of the organization, which in turn influence the unwritten rules of the masses. Though considered as a stereotype by some, experts have explained soldiers and militaries as being inherently masculine and aggressive in nature⁸³ – CAF soldiers are no exception. Though Canada incorporates more and more females across its ranks, and women are officially welcome to serve in any occupation, it is still vastly male, with only 16% of CAF members identifying as women.⁸⁴ Policies, doctrine, and systems have been traditionally built from a male perspective and naturally adapted to best suit the masculine majority. It is perhaps therefore of little surprise that much of the military culture within the CAF originates from the standardization of the values of its highly masculine, white, heterosexual members, also referred to as militarized masculinity.⁸⁵ This form of masculinity encourages the embodiments of "toughness, violence, aggression, courage, control, and domination" among both male and female members and demanding that members distance themselves from feminine qualities.⁸⁶ Other authors have pushed the definition further, linking the values of militarized masculinity to the values of an 'ideal soldier.'⁸⁷ This ideal soldier holding these values is arguably supported by the history of warfighting and traditional definitions of a soldier, built and reinforced through observations of successful operations and combat. Further reinforcing this ideal soldier concept is the

⁸³ Vanessa Brown and Allan Okros, "Disrupting Social Constructions...", 152-153 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45570-5_10.

⁸⁴ Lise Bourgon, "The CAF Path Towards its 25.1% Employment Equity Objective: A Look through the Lenses of Attraction and Recruitment," *Canadian Military Journal* 22, no. 1 (2021), 6-8. <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/PDFs/CMJ221Ep5.pdf>

⁸⁵ Cristina Masters, "Bodies of Technology: Cyborg Soldiers and Militarized Masculinities," *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 7, no. 1 (2005): 117-119.

⁸⁶ Vanessa Brown and Allan Okros, "Disrupting Social Constructions...", 152-153.

⁸⁷ Nicole Wegner, "Helpful Heroes and the Political Utility of Militarized Masculinities." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 23, no. 1 (2021): 7.

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14616742.2020.1855079?needAccess=true>

stereotypical gender role of military members as male; Brown explains that in order to embody these ideal masculine qualities of a soldier, members are required to distance themselves from both feminine behaviour and experience, thus creating or reinforcing the masculine culture.⁸⁸

Equally important to understanding CAF culture is that the CAF maintains complete control over its professional military education, policies, and doctrine. The Department of National Defence has employed external authorities for consultation on CAF processes and culture, with varying degrees of scope, such as the Deschamps and Arbour external review authorities.⁸⁹ The proposed plans to implement the recommendations found therein have been mostly conceived, implemented, and monitored by the CAF, with little exterior oversight. The implementation of the Deschamps report recommendations took the form of the now terminated Operation Honour,⁹⁰ and subsequently became part of the scope of Justice Arbours external review.⁹¹ Regarding professional military education, the CAF maintains its own training institutions and dictates educational curriculum material in the few cases where accredited universities are sought to provide academic training to its members.⁹²

CAF ethos statements has evolved over the last three decades, though it has continued to use similar language, values, and beliefs to describe the idea of culture. CAF culture based on its values-in-use is evermore challenging to observe, analyze, and guide due to the complex plethora of influences on espoused values, beliefs, and assumptions. Complicating the concept of culture

⁸⁸ V. Brown, and A. Okros, “Dancing around gender: Changing identity in Canada’s post Deschamps military.” In *Culture and the soldier: Identities, values, and norms in military engagements*, ed. H. C. Breede, (Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press, 2019), 43.

⁸⁹ Marie Deschamps [External Review Authority], *External review...*, and Louise Arbour [External Review Authority], *Report of the...*

⁹⁰ Department of National Defence, Operation Honour, last modified 18 November 2018 <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/benefits-military/conflict-misconduct/sexual-misconduct/about-operation-honour.html>

⁹¹ Louise Arbour [External Review Authority], *Report of the...*, 320-321.

⁹² Vanessa Brown and Allan Okros, “Disrupting Social Constructions..., 152-153.

is the start-state; militarized masculine values and the barriers which must be disrupted and removed to encourage diversity across the force. Finally, CAF change initiatives which align its culture with the culture of the society it serves are perhaps hampered by lack of oversight. This lack of oversight and independent input into the system potentially damages the perceived accountability to society. This argument is further developed by the CAF office of the ombudsman in their 2021 position paper “*Independent civilian oversight: the defence community deserves no less.*”⁹³ In her recent report Justice Arbour contested the idea on the grounds that the CAF does not require another process to further complicate the system in regards to sexual misconduct.⁹⁴ However, she does recommend that a monitor, external to the defence team, be appointed to oversee the implementation of her recommendations.⁹⁵

This chapter indicated that the CAF defines its own culture through its ethos. This mix of power and role organizational culture is also a melting pot of many different cultures, along the lines of race, occupations, elements (army, navy, airforce), language, religion, and geography, to name a few. However, current CAF culture has been characterized by observers as hyper-masculine⁹⁶ and as a militarized masculine culture,⁹⁷ founded on decades of masculine policies, processes, systems, and ways of thinking. CAF culture is inherently resistant to change as those who lead at the highest levels choose and prepare their replacements. A final consideration on the idea of CAF culture is the nature of its task; to protect Canada and its interests at home and abroad, and the idea of unlimited liability, or giving one's life in service to their country. These

⁹³ Ombudsman for the DND and the CAF, *Independent civilian oversight : the defence community deserves no less - a position paper*, (Ottawa, Ombudsman for National Defence and CAF, 2021).

⁹⁴ Louise Arbour [External Review Authority], *Report of the...*, 276-278

⁹⁵ *ibid*, 305.

⁹⁶ Vanessa Brown and Allan Okros, “Disrupting Social Constructions...”, 152-153.

⁹⁷ Nicole Wegner, “Helpful heroes ...”, 7.

elements ensure that any organizational change campaign would be challenging to design, implement, observe, and correct as required.

CHAPTER 3 THE CURRENT SITUATION OF THE CAF

The study of history lies at the foundation of all sound military conclusions and practice.

— Alfred Thayer Mahan

For more than a quarter-century, the CAF has been subjected to many independent reviews and inquiries. These reviews have been centred on observed, perceived, or suspected actions that would be against its ethos.⁹⁸ They have constantly thrust the CAF's values into the spotlight and have informed considerable action on CAF culture. Any study or attempt to apply the framework presented in chapter two would first require a standard reference based on these external reviews. This chapter seeks to inform the reader by summarizing the various reports and findings of the last few decades. It will also delve into the aspects of organizational culture that need to be addressed to achieve organizational change in the years to come.

The first section seeks to develop which aspects of CAF culture require change initiatives to encourage lasting organizational change. Based on the works of Brown and Okros, these aspects will form the start point of analysis. The second section will provide a brief history of critical events and recommendations from the Somalia affair to the review of DND and CAF by Justice Arbour. Section two will also delve into the recently ratified Heyder-Beattie Class action lawsuit, where \$900 million was approved to be distributed over the nearly 19 000 claims of sexual misconduct victims. The third section will summarize initiatives that the CAF seeks to implement or has implemented over the last year to inform this study's analysis in chapter four. This chapter's fourth and final section will focus on initiatives specifically aimed at professional development and professional military education.

⁹⁸ Marie Deschamps [External Review Authority], *External review...*; and Louise Arbour [External Review Authority], *Report of the...*,

Section One - The Influences on Military Culture

As part of their work on analyzing institutions within the CAF, Brown and Okros, have drawn on the theories of W. Richard Scott, an American sociologist and Emeritus Professor at Stanford University, specializing in institutional theory and organizational science.⁹⁹ Both Brown and Okros are employed by the Canadian Forces College (CFC) and have published many works evaluating diversity and culture within the CAF. Their most recent collaboration elaborated and applied Scott's theories on institutional analysis to a 2017 critical review of CAF gender integration programs¹⁰⁰ as a start point to show how individual conduct could begin to be influenced. Their work established three areas to consider for organizational change: regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive, depicted in figure 3.1 and elaborated below.




Figure 3.1 – Brown and Okros' institutional analysis
Source: Vanessa Brown and Allan Okros, "Shifting the Spotlight...", 12.

⁹⁹ Vanessa Brown and Allan Okros, "Shifting the Spotlight...", 11-12

¹⁰⁰ R.C. MacLean, *Equal but unfair: the failure of gender integration in the Canadian Armed Forces*, Toronto: Canadian Forces College, (2017) in Vanessa Brown and Allan Okros, "Shifting the Spotlight...",11.

Though perhaps evident, these three areas provide different ways to influence beliefs and values within an organization, and thus they become the building blocks of organizational change. This section will first describe these areas and how influence through them is achieved. Most aspects of organizational culture are intertwined, and these three are no exception. This section will then conclude by linking these ideas between themselves and to tangible parts of the CAF culture, providing areas where CAF leadership can perhaps better target change initiatives.

The regulative area refers to the regulations that have become the written laws and directives that shape decisions and serves to constrain and standardize behaviour across the CAF.¹⁰¹ With little room for interpretation, this aspect of culture becomes most easily influenced through transactional leadership; a leadership theory based on rewarding good and punishing unwanted behaviours.¹⁰² However, as described in CAF leadership doctrine, transactional “leadership can easily result in minimal compliance, and by extension, sub-optimal group and individual performance, with individuals’ actions based on efforts to avoid punishment.”¹⁰³ Examples of how to influence the regulative pillar include the National Defence Act, Queen’s Regulations and Orders (QR&O’s), and even the more specific army, navy and air force standing orders. These regulative processes encourage compliance and are not the best suited to lead organizational change because they rely on transactional leadership and are very prescriptive.

The second area, normative processes, describes the day-to-day habits or what a CAF member may refer to as acceptable behaviour.¹⁰⁴ It can be seen through how training is conducted and how norms against misconduct are established and applied. This pillar, more apt

¹⁰¹ Vanessa Brown and Allan Okros, "Shifting the Spotlight...", 12-13.

¹⁰² Department of National Defence, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2005), 133.

¹⁰³ Department of National Defence, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces ...*, 5-6.

¹⁰⁴ Vanessa Brown and Allan Okros, "Shifting the Spotlight...", 12-13

to influence through transformational leadership,¹⁰⁵ allows leaders to interpret and then adapt the day-to-day to the people they lead.¹⁰⁶ Normative processes result in changed behaviour and encourage conformity to organizational norms. To contrast the normative pillar with the regulative pillar, “the norms established by the normative pillar are intended to remain generally stable over time and to be used to influence group norms and individual behaviour.”¹⁰⁷

The third pillar, cultural-cognitive, refers to “initiating change by introducing a new idea or the acceptance of a new assumption or belief” by challenging both individual and shared values or worldviews.¹⁰⁸ Changes to these worldviews can be introduced via two mechanisms: 1) formal systems of professional development and 2) intellectual stimulation and individualized consideration.¹⁰⁹ Professional development systems are perhaps apparent from previous chapters, but both require further elaboration in this context. Though doctrine could be construed as part of the regulatory pillar, once doctrine is understood and taken out of the context of manuals and applied to real-world problems, it becomes much more than how to act or react, as its application is based on the interpretation and understanding of the member.¹¹⁰ The understanding of doctrine is enhanced through professional development and the discussion between members around application of the rules and ideas found therein. The second mechanism is based on the fact that each individual will interpret and grow based on their own perspective of the world around them; in this instance, transformational leaders play a significant role in adapting and guiding each

¹⁰⁵ “A general pattern of influence based on shared core values and mutual commitment and trust between the leader and led, and intended to effect significant or radical improvement in individual, group, or system capabilities and performance.” Department of National Defence, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces...*, 133.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*,

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*,

¹⁰⁸ Vanessa Brown and Allan Okros, "Shifting the Spotlight...", 13.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*,

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*,

person towards the sought.¹¹¹ Leaders who adapt, coach, and mentor subordinates through understanding the interactions of the world around them can effectively guide the beliefs and ideas learnt by the member.¹¹²

Through these facets, the requirement for organizational change to touch on all aspects of CAF life can be identified. By incorporating the framework from chapter two with these influence strategies, a link can be found between the surface – artifacts, values, and beliefs – and their resulting influence on underlying assumptions once they have become widely accepted and are no longer questioned by members of the group. Therefore, to change the CAF organizational culture, initiatives must include the regulations and policies that form the basis for what defines the CAF. This includes everything from how CAF members dress to the consequences for indiscretions, but must be expanded to the understanding of these policies through education and individualized personal growth. Change can also reach into the different systems that guide its members through their day-to-day – how they are managed, employed, and even released from service. Nothing should be considered out of reach – if, through analysis, a process or regulation is deemed essential to influence the basic assumptions of CAF members, then it behooves the organization to consider changes to the elements of the facet in question. In her report, Arbour recognizes the military colleges as institutions considered to be untouchable when it comes to major reforms.¹¹³ An example of such a change that would challenge basic assumptions of the CAF could be found in her recommendation #28 and #29; “Cadet Wing responsibility and authority command structure should be eliminated”¹¹⁴ at the Royal Military Colleges of Canada (RMCC), and “a detailed review of the benefits, disadvantages and costs both for the CAF and

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*,

¹¹² Department of National Defence, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces...*, 68-69.

¹¹³ Louise Arbour [External Review Authority], *Report of the...*, 233.

¹¹⁴ *ibid*, 228.

more broadly, of continuing to educate (Regular Officer Training Plan) cadets at the military colleges.”¹¹⁵

A crucial aspect of CAF organizational culture is the education or the passing of values, information, and knowledge to its members. This importance will be demonstrated through the repeated references to training and education as it pertains to operations or culture in the various reports and reviews of the CAF in section two of this chapter. In the CAF, this education is often referred to as professional development, professional military education, or training. Professional development and military education can be described as developing CAF members to think, analyze problems, and build solutions. To be further discussed in section four, the CAF maintains complete control and influence over how it trains its members. An officer who joins the CAF and attains their degree from the RMC has few opportunities to be socialized outside of the CAF environment. In the Canadian Army, where most training is conducted at a military school or academy, this approach can suffer from group think due to little outside influence.

Section Two: Culture from Somalia to Arbour

As stated in this chapter’s introduction, and already referenced multiple times, the CAF has had its fair share of independent reviews, studies, and news articles regarding its culture over the last quarter-century, resulting in considerable change to the CAF. On March 5, 1995, the Canadian Airborne Regiment was disbanded following the unprofessional actions by the unit during their deployment to Somalia becoming public.¹¹⁶ The Somalia inquiry pushed the CAF to take steps to professionalize its officer and non-commissioned officer corp.¹¹⁷ The Deschamps

¹¹⁵ *ibid*, 234.

¹¹⁶ Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, *Dishonoured legacy...*, 342.

¹¹⁷ Richard Foot, “Somalia Affair,” *The Canadian Encyclopedia*, last modified 27 sept 2019.
<https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/somalia-affair>

report in 2015 resulted in a line of effort to deal with sexual misconduct across the CAF, dubbed Operation Honour.¹¹⁸ It provided direction to CAF leadership on how to deal with instances of sexual misconduct as well as indications of zero tolerance within the ranks of the military. Recently the MND had assigned the responsibility for sexual harassment and similar allegations to organizations independent of the CAF following the interim recommendations of Justice Arbour's independent external review.¹¹⁹ This section will break down these individual reviews to identify common themes over the last three decades and inform discussion in chapter four.

Section 2.1: Somalia

From 1992 to 1993, the CAF participated in the UN peacekeeping mission to Somalia. Events during this deployment showed a military system in need of change and evolution; from hazing activities to the murder of a Somali teenager in CAF custody, to attempted suicide of CAF members, to withholding or altering critical information to protect the organization.¹²⁰ These events contributed significantly to dwindling public confidence in the CAF and international partners' poor perspective of Canadian military capabilities.¹²¹ Following these events, the Government of Canada ordered a public board of inquiry to show transparency to Canadians.

After requesting an extension to at least December 1997, the board was ordered to complete hearings by March 31st, 1997, and provide a report with recommendations by June 30th,

¹¹⁸ Department of National Defence, "Operation Honour," last modified 18 November 2021. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/benefits-military/conflict-misconduct/sexual-misconduct/about-operation-honour.html>

¹¹⁹ Louise Arbour [External Review Authority], *Interim recommendations ...*, 2.

¹²⁰ Richard Foot, "Somalia Affair," *The Canadian Encyclopedia*, last modified 27 sept 2019. <https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/somalia-affair>

¹²¹ Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, *Dishonoured legacy...*, 37, and Richard Foot, "Somalia Affair," *The Canadian Encyclopedia*, last modified 27 sept 2019. <https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/somalia-affair>

1997.¹²² The board of inquiry, unable to investigate the actual events, with only enough time to study the pre-deployment training and various structures of the CAF having an impact on the Airborne regiments deployment to Somalia, provided the final report with over 150 recommendations.¹²³ These recommendations were spread over twelve themes, including leadership, training, accountability, and military justice.¹²⁴ Of interest to this paper, chapter five of the inquiry report addresses the particularities of CAF military culture, identifying many elements that are distinct to military culture and persist in most militaries in the 21st century.

Though dated June 1997, many of the explications and specifics of military culture found in the Somalia report may sound familiar to a soldier, sailor, or aviator in today's CAF.¹²⁵ The report outlined how distinct CAF culture is from Canadian culture, which “flows from the distinctive mandate of the (CAF) to maintain the security and defend the sovereignty of Canada, if necessary, by means of force.”¹²⁶ A second element that differentiates CAF culture from the rest of Canada is that “the responsibility of military leadership permits the sacrifice of soldiers’ lives in order to achieve military objectives”¹²⁷ – or the idea of ultimate sacrifice for one’s nation. Finally the report underlined that military culture is seen as physically separate from the rest of Canadian society – bases are often in isolated areas with activities centred within its confines, while military personnel live near their garrison in subdivisions that seem like extensions of the local base.¹²⁸

¹²² Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, *Dishonoured legacy...*, 3.

¹²³ *Ibid.*,

¹²⁴ *ibid.*, 9.

¹²⁵ *ibid.*, 123-126

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*,

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*,

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*,

The inquiry report also identified the importance of sub-cultures within the CAF, noting the existence of a regimental culture within the army which maintained significant influence over personnel management and culture.¹²⁹ This sub-culture, branded as resistant to whistleblowers or criticism from outside the group by the inquiry, is defined by solidarity within the group; members look out for each other, even beyond the regiment's garrison. The regimental culture also encourages exclusiveness – where disrespect for authorities outside of the regiment was common.¹³⁰ Perhaps the greatest challenge facing regimental culture is the loyalty, essential for armed conflict, which extends to peacetime; “a group of this kind (can) foster and maintain inappropriate norms, but by assuring anonymity through norms of group loyalty and by imposing severe sanctions for violations of the solidarity norm, it can facilitate acts of subversion and defiance.”¹³¹

The ethical building blocks of CAF culture were not taught early in soldiers' or officers' careers, which has been corrected in the last few decades with *Duty with Honour*. However, it did identify that the CAF had complete control over its educational programs; the military “defines content, means, methods, and planning.”¹³² The report also identified that much of CAF training for officers occurs at RMC, the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College in Toronto, and the Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College in Kingston. Since the Somalia report, training material has been in constant evolution; however, the institutions have maintained many of their responsibilities;¹³³ developmental phases for officers are still

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*,

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*,

¹³¹ *Ibid.*,

¹³² *Ibid.*,

¹³³ Department of National Defence, “About the Canadian Forces College,” Last modified 17 September 2015, <https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/200-eng.html>

conducted by the latter two, while RMC graduated approximately 230 new officers for the CAF in 2020.¹³⁴

Though rushed to completion and scathing towards many of the processes of the CAF, the Somalia inquiry provides a unique insight into CAF culture. The report outlined the distinct nature of CAF organizational culture from the perspective of the public that it serves. Some of the important aspects to this study include the physical separation of CAF members from the Canadian population and a unique training system that brings soldiers and officers together from across the CAF to teach the art of warfighting and its associated values. The report's conclusion states that “it may not be enough simply to articulate an ethos and exhort soldiers to follow it” and that “the military, led by its senior officers, needs to reclaim the ethical high ground.”¹³⁵

Section 2.2: Deschamps report and Operation Honour

Following an increase in reports and accusations of sexual assault and sexual harassment in 2014, retired Justice Marie Deschamps was hired to conduct an external review of the CAF regarding these subjects. Over 700 individuals contributed to her external review, which analyzed CAF culture, processes, procedures, programs, external resources, and training surrounding sexual misconduct and ethical culture.¹³⁶ The report was finalized in March 2015 and provided the CDS with ten recommendations. Two were immediately accepted, while the remaining eight were accepted in principle.¹³⁷

¹³⁴ Department Of National Defence, “More than 230 new officers graduate from RMC in virtual ceremony,” Last modified 21 May 2020. <https://www.rmc-cmr.ca/en/college-commandants-office/about-royal-military-college-canada>

¹³⁵ *ibid.*, 1341.

¹³⁶ Marie Deschamps [External Review Authority], *External review...*, i-ii.

¹³⁷ CBC news, “Military harassment report: 10 recommendations”, last modified 30 apr 2015. <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/military-harassment-report-10-recommendations-1.3055935>

The report identified a disjunction within CAF culture – where high professional standards outlined in CAF policies did not reflect the reality experienced by many members.¹³⁸ The culture experienced by members was determined to be very sexualized, especially among recruits and non-commissioned members. This type of sexualized culture is commonplace to the point that members become desensitized the longer they spend in the CAF and the higher the rank they attain.¹³⁹ Similar to the Somalia inquiry, the Deschamps report challenges senior leaders to act, this time against a culture that they are perceived to support or to which they turn a blind eye.¹⁴⁰

Regarding training, the report confirmed what many CAF members might already know; the training strategies based on group PowerPoint and online learning fail to pass the message onto the training audience.¹⁴¹ The training model at the time “lack(ed) credibility and further perpetuat(ed) the view that the CAF does not take sexual harassment and assault seriously.”¹⁴² Recommendations to the CAF included providing inappropriate sexual conduct as a stand-alone topic and should be carried out by skilled professionals in small groups utilizing interactive techniques.

Justice Deschamps identified that policy change would not be enough if faced with an unchanged culture in the report's concluding section.¹⁴³ The report's broad recommendations demanded that the CAF address; “low-level sexual harassment” and its sexualized culture demonstrated through the common use of sexualized language; that strong leadership convey

¹³⁸ Marie Deschamps [External Review Authority], *External review...*, i-ii.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*,

¹⁴⁰ *ibid.*, iii.

¹⁴¹ *ibid.*, vii.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, vi.

¹⁴³ *ibid.*, 86.

clear messages regarding sexual conduct; that the integration of women grows to include positions in senior leadership; and that confidence in the organization be re-built through the establishment of an independent agency to handle reporting of sexual misconduct and provide support to victims.¹⁴⁴ From this report, Operation Honour was born and LGen Whitecross was assigned to oversee its implementation and report on progress.

In March 2021, Operation Honour was terminated by the acting CDS in favour of a more complete campaign plan for culture change.¹⁴⁵ This campaign plan was to be generated and managed by CPCC a new command subordinate to both the deputy MND and the CDS.¹⁴⁶ As per many of the recommendations provided within the Deschamps external review, most of the successes of Operation Honour addressed victims and victim support.¹⁴⁷ The less successful initiatives centred around culture shifts, independence of the Sexual Misconduct Response Centre, avoiding subject matter fatigue by CAF members, and sexual misconduct tracking.¹⁴⁸

Section 2.3: Heyder-Beattie settlement and recommendations

In 2019, the Canadian federal court authorized close to 900 million in settlement payouts to nearly 19 000 claimants that claimed to be victims of sexual misconduct. As part of this settlement, a final summary report was generated to provide an overview of recommendations based on three Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) who were consulted to gain insight on how “to

¹⁴⁴ *ibid.*, 27, 86-87.

¹⁴⁵ Murray Brewster, “Campaign to end sexual harassment in CAF shut down,” CBC news, last modified 24 March 2021, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/operation-honour-closed-down-1.5962978>

¹⁴⁶ Department of National Defence, “Chief Professional Conduct and Culture,” last modified 5 May 2022. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/organizational-structure/chief-professional-conduct-culture.html>

¹⁴⁷ Department of National Defence, “Operation Honour – What worked and what did not,” last modified 27 February 2019. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/sexual-misbehaviour/progress-report-four/part-four.html>

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*,

improve gender representation, diversity and inclusion in the CAF.”¹⁴⁹ This section will briefly outline the three recommendations reports for the CAF to adopt.

The first recommendation aims to address the biases associated with the military workplace. This recommendation is authored by expert in gender roles, social change and citizen engagement in the military and security, Dr. Maya Eichler, and is titled “The Redesigning of the CAF Workplace to Enable Culture Change.” This workplace, initially “built around the norm of the (anglophone) white, heterosexual, cisgender male service member,” is adapted to persons belonging to or resembling that portion of the Canadian public.¹⁵⁰ Those that do not demonstrate the associated traits of warrior masculinity do not enjoy in full the privileges offered by the organization.¹⁵¹ Eichler challenges the assumption that systemic change is not required to address the lack of sex/gender diversity and sexual misconduct in the workplace. She opines that a change in thinking is required to remove the onus for change from women and diverse Canadians and be placed on the service to create an inclusive and welcoming workplace for the people the service seeks to recruit.

The second recommendation authored by expert in adult education, Dr. Nancy Taber, and titled “Eliminating unearned privilege: Problematizing the warrior ideal,” aims to address leadership, promotion processes and organizational culture. Taber offers recent scandals involving senior military leaders, all of whom fit a particular mould, as proof of a “one-path model” for promotion.¹⁵² This one-path model reinforces that “one’s service and embodiment

¹⁴⁹ Maya Eichler, “Redesigning the CAF workplace ...; Nancy Taber, “Eliminating unearned privilege ...; and Grazia Scoppio, “If you build it, they will come....”

¹⁵⁰ Maya Eichler, “Redesigning the CAF workplace ...”, 22.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*,

¹⁵² Nancy Taber, “Eliminating unearned privilege....”, 56.

must match a particular ideal.”¹⁵³ Taber opines that “CAF members are socialized and indoctrinated into a military way of life through formal and informal training” and the measure of a member’s success can be linked to how well they respond to this socialization.¹⁵⁴ This informal training is key to learning basic assumptions and CAF culture, as described in chapter two of this paper.

The third and final recommendation, "If you build it they will come," is authored by Dr. Grazia Scoppio, an expert in diversity in military organizations, military education, and organizational learning. Since education plays a major role in organizational change, education and training must be defined and their differences identified. “An educational program aims to provide a base of knowledge and intellectual skills (...) upon which information can be correctly interpreted and sound judgement exercised.”¹⁵⁵ Scoppio’s definition underscores the impact of education on intellectual skills and judgement. Conversely a “training programs aims to develop job – or occupation – specific skills and knowledge to perform specific tasks (...) which have a beginning and an end.”¹⁵⁶ In the context of organizational change ideas such as beginnings, ends, and learning associated with specific skills or tasks do not adequately address the underlying beliefs and values required for change. Scoppio opines that the CAF can re-build an inclusive, diverse, equitable and accountable military through education.¹⁵⁷ Her recommendation report explains that through systemic issues, an unwillingness to learn, and a one-size-fits-all training system, the CAF in its current state cannot increase the representation of women in uniform.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*,

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*,

¹⁵⁵ Grazia Scoppio, “If you build it, they will come...”, 82.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*,

¹⁵⁷ *ibid.*, 76.

¹⁵⁸ *ibid.*, 77-78.

Current CAF efforts are inadequate, uncoordinated, and incoherent, serving as training vice educational programs.¹⁵⁹

The Heyder-Beattie summary report outlines the challenges facing the CAF from an academic perspective versus the first-hand observations from the Deschamps, Arbour, and Somalia reports. The final summary report reinforces an ill-adapted training system, a hyper-masculine culture, and systems traditionally built to accommodate the anglophone, white, heterosexual, cisgender male service member that have been the majority since the forces were founded. It reinforces findings from the various external reviews with academic perspectives and is an excellent debut towards framing the problem and identifying plausible solutions. Regarding influence strategies, the report focuses more on the educational and normative aspects of culture, and recommendations are well suited to address militarized masculinity.

Section 2.4: Arbour and trends over the years

In April 2021, retired Justice Louise Arbour was engaged to conduct an independent external comprehensive review of the DND and CAF following allegations of incidents perpetrated by senior CAF leaders.¹⁶⁰ The month preceding the publication of the terms of reference for the review saw the termination of Operation Honour, the CAF response to the 2015 Deschamps report. The comprehensive review was ordered to evaluate “current policies, procedures, programs, practices and culture within the CAF and DND” as well as “identify barriers to reporting inappropriate behaviour and to assess the adequacy of the response.”¹⁶¹ The review was also given authority to evaluate “the recruitment, training, performance evaluation,

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 82.

¹⁶⁰ Marieke Walsh, “Military has ‘failed’ to keep women in uniform safe from sexual assault, former justice Louise Arbour finds,” *The Globe and Mail*, last accessed 31 May 2022. <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-military-has-failed-to-keep-women-in-uniform-safe-from-sexual-assault/>

¹⁶¹ Louise Arbour [External Review Authority], *Report of the...*, 320.

posting and promotion systems in the CAF, as well as the military justice systems policies, procedures and practice to respond to such allegations.”¹⁶² Furthermore, Arbour was asked “to make recommendations on preventing and eradicating harassment and sexual misconduct.”¹⁶³ In Oct 2021, Arbour provided an interim assessment and recommendation regarding the investigation and prosecution of sexual assaults. She recommended that instead of prosecution under the National Defence Act, these matters “should instead be referred to civilian authorities on a temporary basis.”¹⁶⁴

Arbour’s final report was delivered to the government on the May 20th, 2022, however, and in it she recommends to eliminate dual processes and that the transfer to civilian authorities become permanent.¹⁶⁵ This recommendation, along with 47 others, offer unique ways to challenge the deeply entrenched culture of the CAF. Important to note, and included in her recommendations for an external monitor, these recommendations are no more legally binding than past reports.¹⁶⁶ However, the Government initially accepted 17 of the recommendations, including the appointment of an external monitor to oversee the implementation of the recommendations of the report, and indicated that the other 31 recommendations would be accepted after a plan could be built to implement them. In her concluding remarks, Justice Arbour stated that many of the recommendations of the various reports over the years have sat on shelves, effectively collecting dust, and therefore asked the government to identify those recommendations not to be implemented and to concentrate on what is deemed important.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*,

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*,

¹⁶⁴ Louise Arbour [External Review Authority], *Interim recommendations ...*, 2.

¹⁶⁵ Louise Arbour [External Review Authority], *Report of the...*, 100-103.

¹⁶⁶ Louise Arbour [External Review Authority], *Report of the...*, 303.

Regarding un-implemented recommendations, the Somalia Report saw its fair share. However, credit must be given to the CAF, the Somalia Report shook its process and brought about sweeping change, notable in education requirements for CAF officers, and raising the militaries overall professionalism.¹⁶⁷ Other reports enjoyed similar treatment, where leaders concentrated on process or further study of problems.¹⁶⁸ As such, culture change in the CAF has been either very slow or elusive for the last two decades. In May 2021, senior fellow at the Macdonald Laurier institute and researcher into Canadian defence policy Richard Shimooka, opined that the government did not correctly address the issues of accountability and leadership within the forces. For most of the last decade, the CAF has been fighting to adapt its current processes and systems through policy adjustments to allow for a more diverse representation in its ranks.¹⁶⁹ The values and norms at the core of military culture, as depicted in the Somalia report and demonstrated by the persistence of similar observations through the more recent external reviews, demonstrate that efforts to change culture have only addressed military culture on the surface, and have failed to change core values and assumptions.¹⁷⁰

As seen throughout the various independent reviews, the Somalia inquiry, and the Heyder-Beattie summary report, the CAF must begin to re-evaluate many of its systems and processes that have existed for decades. As demonstrated by the persistence of issues, the core values, especially those most sacred to the military profession, need to be at a minimum evaluated for change. Though welcome and encouraging further evaluation of the status quo, the

¹⁶⁷ Richard Shimooka, “The lessons Canada’s Military didn’t learn from the Somalia inquiry,” *The National Post*, last modified 12 May 2021. <https://nationalpost.com/opinion/richard-shimooka-the-lessons-canadas-military-didnt-learn-from-the-somalia-inquiry>

¹⁶⁸ CBC news, “Military harassment report: 10 recommendations...,”

¹⁶⁹ Lise Bourgon, “The CAF Path towards its 25.1% employment equity objective: A look through the lenses of attraction and recruitment.” *Canadian Military Journal* [Vol. 22, No. 1, Winter 2021]

¹⁷⁰ Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, *Dishonoured legacy...*, 123-126; and Louise Arbour [External Review Authority], *Report of the ...*, 1, 308.

CAF must go beyond changing the policies that guide aspects on the peripheries of service and begin evaluating some of the aspects that have traditionally defined the military as a larger effort to change CAF organizational culture. Equally as important as the re-evaluation of these processes is the implication of senior CAF leadership. As demonstrated by Arbour's recommendation to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of officer training at RMC, changes are not aimed to destroy culture, but to ignore basic assumptions to determine if a better way exists to conduct education as she identifies "closing the colleges altogether would be a missed opportunity."¹⁷¹ The scope and breadth of this latest review indicate the attitudes and motivation of senior CAF leadership. Though for different reasons, some of the concluding remarks from the Somalia inquiry still ring true; "The military, led by its senior officers, needs to reclaim the ethical high ground. We urge senior leaders of the CAF to redefine the characteristics and values of the Canadian military and to establish the capability to monitor the CAF on an ongoing basis."¹⁷² The following section will list some of the implemented and planned initiatives and briefly summarize the processes that are being evaluated for change.

Section Three: Change Initiatives

Initiatives will be broken down into their respective categories in line with the facets explained in section one; regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive. Since education and training have been a constant recommendation, inspiring specific chapters and sections across independent reviews¹⁷³ and the Somalia Inquiry,¹⁷⁴ they will only be touched on briefly in this section as they will be subjected to a deeper evaluation in section four. Key initiatives will be

¹⁷¹ Louise Arbour [External Review Authority], *Report of the...*, 233.

¹⁷² Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, *Dishonoured legacy...*, 1341.

¹⁷³ Louise Arbour [External Review Authority], *Report of the...*, 208, and Marie Deschamps [External Review Authority], *External review...*, 81.

¹⁷⁴ Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, *Dishonoured legacy...*, 22.

separated into three categories; completed/ongoing, short-term, and medium-term. Of note, the initiatives listed here were provided by CMP during a town-hall briefing by its acting commander¹⁷⁵ or through the individual recommendation reports of the Heyder-Beattie final summary report¹⁷⁶ – little response on ongoing or planned initiatives outside of education was received by the author from CPCC.

Implemented and ongoing initiatives include regulative changes such as changes to the leave policies as well as maternity and parental benefits. Normative changes include initiatives for selection board criteria, indigenous cultures awareness training, development of a total health and wellness strategy, development of a CAF retention strategy, and a Women in Force Program.¹⁷⁷ Regarding cultural-cognitive changes, various support systems for women and LGBTQS+ members, and working groups to further indigenous knowledge and learning among CAF members.

Short-term initiatives for regulative changes include changes to the QR&O regarding pay allotments and compulsory payments and developing a CAF pay equity plan.¹⁷⁸ Normative changes will be brought to how the CAF evaluates personnel performance and competency and how recruiters and instructors are selected and trained. Short-term cultural-cognitive changes will see working groups on career management, redevelopment of the Gender Based Analysis Plus (GBA+) curriculum, and inclusion of evidence-based frameworks for character-based assessments.

¹⁷⁵ Lise Bourgon (Commander's General Assembly, CMP/MLPERSCOM, Ottawa, Canada, 5 May 2022).

¹⁷⁶ Grazia Scoppio, "If you build it, they will come...", Nancy Taber, "Eliminating unearned privilege...", and Maya Eichler, "Redesigning the CAF workplace ...".

¹⁷⁷ Lise Bourgon (Commander's General Assembly, CMP/MLPERSCOM, Ottawa, Canada, 5 May 2022).

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*,

Medium-term initiatives for regulative changes include reviewing Defence Administrative Orders and Directives, specifically regulations guiding enrolment.¹⁷⁹ Regarding Normative changes, indigenous programs will be expanded, and other normative changes will be finalized. Finally, cultural-cognitive initiatives will include advancing cultural change through teaching and the completion of other short-term initiatives.

Additional initiatives and plans such as those recommended by experts in the Heyder-Beattie settlement report are also worth analysis. These initiatives are more global in their approach, seeking to address many objectives through their application and offer a more wholesome effort to address culture through education. The first recommendation report included in the settlement document provides advice on how to begin understanding the CAF environment and systemic biases. It then offers to take the understanding of those biases to breakdown barriers and design a workplace that encourages inclusiveness and equity.¹⁸⁰ Eichler ends her report with recommendations on improving accountability, to include making research public and “supporting external mechanisms for greater transparency.”¹⁸¹ These initiatives address all three areas of influence as it encourage changes through compliance to policies, new behaviours through conformity, and finally new ideas through providing understanding and education around current issues.

The second recommendation addresses change through evaluating how CAF systems are structured, and specifically targets the recruitment, retention, and promotion systems¹⁸². Taber suggests that the CAF move away from looking at the “bad apples” and begin addressing the

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*,

¹⁸⁰ Maya Eichler, “Redesigning the CAF workplace . . .”, 37-40

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*,

¹⁸² Nancy Taber, “Eliminating unearned privilege: Problematizing the warrior ideal . . .”, 50-51

source of the issue, the militarized masculine culture through informal learning. Returning to the idea of vulnerability first introduced in chapter two, the concept of asking soldiers to question the essence of what it means to be a warrior will introduce vulnerability into the environment. The idea of acknowledging or admitting that they need “more information to understand an issue and take action can be an uncomfortable expression of vulnerability, particularly for military members trained to exhibit strength and confidence.”¹⁸³ This vulnerability complicates organizational culture change but is an important step in building new ideas and beliefs through creativity and education. Challenging the unknown will encourage creativity and therefore challenge the essence of current culture, possibly destabilizing it enough to allow for it to change.

The final initiative from the Heyder-Beattie settlement report is centred on challenging beliefs and arming leaders with an educational tool to challenge current knowledge, ideas, and beliefs.¹⁸⁴ This educational tool is adaptive to rank, experiences, and is not a one-time training. It focuses on continued learning and provides an interface into cultural cognitive change for transformational leaders to begin guiding and mentoring subordinates to better understanding of their workplace and environment. This last recommendation could also supplement the efforts and recommendations found in the other two reports. It, arguably, defines clear criteria, skills and values that could redefine the elements sought in soldiers of any rank; willingness to learn, professionalism, trust, flexibility, problem solving, leadership, diplomacy, communication, critical thinking, and creativity.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸³ *ibid*, 59.

¹⁸⁴ Grazia Scoppio, “If you build it, they will come ...”, 75-76.

¹⁸⁵ *ibid*, 87.

This section has evaluated some of the current culture change initiatives briefed by the CMP as well as some of the proposed changes through the Heyder-Beattie Settlement final report. Though other initiatives from a broader CAF organizational change were not evaluated, this section has demonstrated that between current and proposed initiatives, the essence of military culture should be challenged. Current initiatives from CMP concentrate on policies and their implementation, which is to be expected from the directorate that manages policies and human resources. The inclusion of the recommendations from, or initiatives similar to, the Heyder-Beattie settlement will go far in addressing the understanding of the environment and encouraging members to adopt new beliefs after challenging any they may already have.

Section Four: Canadian Defence Academy – The Future of CAF Learning

In a purely academic sense, being diverse is “composed of distinct or unlike elements or qualities.”¹⁸⁶ The CAF and many independent reviews have identified training and education as essential levers to respond to some of the outcomes and the situation identified and elaborated upon in section two. The CDA, or the CAF organization charged with designing, delivering, and overseeing common professional development, has been asked to refine, build, and explore various options to assist CAF culture change initiatives. Their framework document identified that training alone may be insufficient; “in response to a misconduct incident or activities indicates that the efficacy or the learning outcomes that are achieved by training events have little effect and are not on the whole long-lasting.”¹⁸⁷ The application of self-study packages and online learning, though useful for providing information “en-masse” do not encourage discussion

¹⁸⁶ Merriam-Webster Dictionary, “Diverse definition and Meaning,” last accessed 10 march 2022.
<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/diverse>

¹⁸⁷ Canadian Defence Academy. *CDA Culture Change Framework FY22/23 to FY23/24: CAF PD System Support to Culture Change*, (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, 2022), 2

between CAF sub-cultures and thus ignoring the crucial role in aiding its members in identifying inappropriate behaviour through the discussion of these ideas.

Learning is conducted through two facets, formal and informal. Perhaps unsurprising given the observed differences between CAF espoused values and values-in-use, some experts have indicated that 70% of adult learning within the workplace takes place informally.¹⁸⁸ First formal courses, comprised of both individual learning through the defence learning network, or organized courses at various schools. CAF formal courses are intended to teach and evaluate a minimum standard to which the student is expected to attain in order to be proficient in the subject matter.¹⁸⁹ Teaching beyond this minimum standard would be the subject of professional development, mainly in an informal environment post formal training, and highly dependent on the individual's thirst to develop their aptitudes. The second facet of learning, through informal means, takes place everywhere in the CAF and ensures the passing on of values and beliefs that are unwritten. It happens in common areas from military mess'¹⁹⁰ and canteens to smoking areas and fire picket in the middle of the night.¹⁹¹ These discussions can often elaborate on daily events or current affairs and can inform a soldiers world view. In order to influence the 70% of

¹⁸⁸ Sharan B. Merriam and Lisa M. Baumgartner, *Learning in Adulthood: A Comprehensive Guide*, 4th ed, (John Wiley & Sons, 2020), quoted in Canadian Defence Academy. *CDA Culture Change Framework FY22/23 to FY23/24: CAF PD System Support to Culture Change*, (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, 2022), 2

¹⁸⁹ During the author's time as an Instructor in Gunnery at the Royal Canadian Artillery School, the importance of respecting the minimum standard set out in the training plan was constantly stressed. Any training that was to happen outside of the training plan was the responsibility of field units, and evaluating outside of training plan was expressly and understably forbidden. This ensured a common level of knowledge for soldiers arriving at their home units and allowed for further learning to become cyclic and easier to manage.

¹⁹⁰ Military mess' are the area's where CAF personnel eat, relax, and are permitted to consume alcohol on the base. They are traditionally divided by ranks, with most bases sporting a "Junior Ranks Mess" for ranks from private to master corporal, "Senior Non-Commissioned Officer Mess" for ranks from sergeants to chief warrant officer, and "Officer Mess" for ranks from officer cadets to general

¹⁹¹ During military field exercises that take place over-night, military members often sleep in tents where no fire-alarms are present. As such, a roaming fire picket, dividing the night into blocks of one to two hours shifts, is established where two soldiers are often chosen from the group to stand watch for fires. During this time, soldiers get to know one another and talk about any subject in an effort to not fall asleep.

adult learning through informal means, the CAF must design its programs to encourage informed discussions in these environments.

The CDA culture change framework also identifies the importance of training and education on the socialization process “not just from an onboarding perspective but training and education systems assist in orienting members to new roles within the organization throughout their careers.”¹⁹² The cycle of the current generation of CAF leadership passing on values-in-use must be disrupted to allow the organization to change its accepted and used values. This is an inherently difficult task since the institution controls CAF professional military education with little outside influence, and the human being is naturally drawn to those with similar values, as described by the “like promotes like” concept explained in chapter two.

Currently, the CAF streamlines much of its military education through individual institutions that are either trade-specific, such as the Royal Canadian Artillery School,¹⁹³ or subject-specific, such as the Peace Support Training Centre.¹⁹⁴ These schools are designed to teach military occupations or material required to support operations. In the case of officers, the breadth and depth of these training opportunities and courses can vary for each individual element and trade. The army has perhaps the most intense touchpoint common to all army officers, a five-month army operations course designed to provide captains with a shared understanding of army tactics and planning.¹⁹⁵ CAF-wide, officers first come together for basic

¹⁹² Canadian Defence Academy. *CDA Culture Change Framework ...*, 2

¹⁹³ Department of National Defence, Other CAF training establishments, last modified 19 March 2018, <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/benefits-military/education-training/establishments/other.html>

¹⁹⁴ Department of National Defence, Peace Support Training Centre, last modified 9 Octobre 2018, <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/benefits-military/education-training/establishments/peace-support.html>

¹⁹⁵ Department of National Defence, Army Operations Course, last modified 4 January 2022, <https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/line-sight/articles/2021/11/army-operations-course-aoc.html>

training but remain largely separated until the rank of major when they attend the CFC for the JCSP.¹⁹⁶ Officers at the rank of colonel who are chosen for further advancement return to the CFC for the National Security Program.¹⁹⁷ Opportunities exist for a small number of officers to conduct these programs with allied countries; however, most officers will complete these programs at CFC. These common touch points occur at important times during an officer's career, where officers are socialized into new roles and responsibilities; basic training upon entry into the CAF; JCSP during the transition to senior staff and mid range command positions; and National Security Program, during preparation for employment as a general or flag officer. These courses teach values, critical thinking, and problem-solving skills while providing artifacts used by officers for the rest of their careers, eventually molding the officer to become the leader who holds the fundamental values and beliefs for command at the highest levels. The proverbial grind of common courses as gateways to promotion furthers Taber's argument of the one-path career progression¹⁹⁸ – either conform to the system or do not progress.

Regarding academic education, other than a bachelors degree required for commissioning for most officers and an optional masters in defence studies during JCSP, little university level or academic education is provided by the current system in place. Though a deep analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, the CAF Junior Officer Development program offers mandatory, online, professional development that is exactly the same for all officers.¹⁹⁹ Such training arguably does little to provide diversity of thought across the officer corp. Beyond this program, officers are

¹⁹⁶Department of National Defence, Syllabus Joint Command and Staff Program Residential, last modified 2 February 2021, <https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/118/406/cfc300-46-eng.pdf>

¹⁹⁷ Department of National Defence, Syllabus National Security Programme, last modified 12 May 2021, <https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/119/187/324/331-eng.pdf>

¹⁹⁸ Nancy Taber, "Eliminating unearned privilege: Problematizing the warrior ideal...", 50

¹⁹⁹ Department of National Defence, Canadian Armed Forces professional development framework, last modified 13 Decembre 2018 <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/benefits-military/education-training/professional-development/framework.html>

encouraged to pursue academic opportunities on their own time, however the demands of the service combined with demands of families or life in general, often cause this to become difficult.²⁰⁰ Though opportunities and incentives exist to be sponsored for further academic courses and formations, they are not common to all elements of the CAF, and are not mandatory. Like an optional course on diversity, such as the complimentary studies course at JCSP entitled “DS 585 - Gender Perspectives in Defence and Security,” optional education does not necessarily further organizational change.

The CDA has recently published a culture change framework informed through discussions with CPCC which elaborates on many initiatives that begin to address CAF culture through creative influences from an educational or training perspective.²⁰¹ The revision of GBA+ mentioned in section three above, executive education programs aimed at the CAF’s most senior leaders, and reviews of both doctrine and training plans for junior leader formal learning²⁰² encourages organizational change. However, room still remains to include the educational aspects recommended through the Heyder-Beattie settlement previously explained in more detail in section three. Though the CDA challenges the status quo through its proposed framework, more could be accomplished to identify biases, intersectionality, micro aggressions, social exclusion and share that knowledge with those expected to enact organizational change.

Conclusion

²⁰⁰ As an example, in an attempt to increase his academic standing in preparation for submitting his candidature for the Masters in Defence Studies through the Joint Command and Staff Course, the author enrolled in a part-time basic introduction to sociology course with Athabasca University. Through the demands of the service and personal life, it took the author nine months to complete the course.

²⁰¹ Canadian Defence Academy. *CDA Culture Change Framework...*,

²⁰² Canadian Defence Academy. *CDA Culture Change Framework...*, 4-6

From the recent collaboration between Brown and Okros, the three influences on military culture are regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive. The values-in-use of the CAF are resilient to change and rooted in militarized masculine ideals. These values-in-use have been present in one form or another since at least the deployment of the CAF to Somalia in 1992-1993. They have resisted changes brought about through regulative and normative influences recommended by the Somalia inquiry. They have persisted through the natural changes and evolutions of the CAF and even through Operation Honour, conceived to change how CAF members approach and perceive the world around them. Perhaps the challenges that faced Operation Honour were rooted in the nature of initiatives and recommendations being regulative in nature – don't do this, do that – and thus heavily influenced by transactional leadership, limiting the organization's ability to grow and learn.

This chapter began by defining ways of influencing military culture before elaborating on the perceived history of the CAF since Somalia through the various reports and reviews. Perhaps the change efforts since Somalia did not sufficiently address the cultural-cognitive and normative aspects of influence which caused changes to become superficial in nature. These changes, therefore, were seemingly unable to change the important aspects of organizational culture; values-in-use. Nevertheless, a perceived deviation from CAF ethos can be observed through the reports elaborated upon in this chapter. In a culture of anarchy seeking to adapt and respond to the world around it, the CAF and its leaders have set out to shake its organizational culture through many change initiatives, some of which have been briefly explained in this chapter. The next chapter will apply the framework to these initiatives in order to identify gaps and possible focus points for current planned CAF organizational change initiatives.

CHAPTER 4 DISCUSSION: CAF AND ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE – IS LASTING CHANGE POSSIBLE?

“People can learn, and if they can learn, they can change, and that includes understanding values and their importance, and acting on them”

— Gen (ret’d) Rick Hillier Leadership: 50 points of wisdom for today’s leaders

Thus far, this paper has described the framework, the situation, and some key proposed culture change initiatives. The situation can be summarized by a militarized masculine culture established over decades of male dominance in a profession guided by traditionally masculine values. Though organizational culture may naturally progress and change, possibly providing an unknown or undesirable endstate, the time has come for the CAF to take ownership of the organizational change and bring culture closer towards one that not only allows the employment of diverse groups and genders but includes them. As coined by Taber; the issue is inclusion, and goes beyond acceptance.²⁰³ Inclusion must be accomplished through initiatives that aim to change how the CAF perceives its members and how its members understand the environment around them. Initiatives that aim to add minorities to the current proverbial pot of culture do not achieve inclusion alone.

Of all the analysis and effort put forth by senior leaders and academics around organizational and culture change, one thing is certain; those leading the institution have acknowledged the importance of military culture to the CAF. This chapter aims to supplement the work already conducted by offering the perspective of one of the proverbial cogs in the CAF machine. In organizing the author’s perspective and opinions, this chapter will first apply the four aspects of the framework (see chapter 2, figure 2.2) to the initiatives in order to identify possible gaps. It will then discuss where the CAF must focus attention to further its

²⁰³ Nancy Taber, “Eliminating unearned privilege: Problematizing the warrior ideal...”, 54-55

organizational change agenda. Finally, this chapter will conclude with areas for further study or analysis, determined to be outside this paper's scope.

Section 1: Applying the Change Model to the Change Initiatives

The framework from chapter two focuses on organizational culture through three different aspects. The first aspect from Shien is that underlying assumptions and beliefs are inherently hard to change as they exist across the organization and within individual sub-cultures;²⁰⁴ change initiatives must address fundamental values and beliefs accepted as the norm by the majority. Second from Pedersen and Sorensen where values are further defined by differentiating between espoused values and values-in-use.²⁰⁵ Through these values-in-use, military cultures become very reactive to their environment; therefore, change initiatives must consider the current culture and understand how current, militarized masculine values²⁰⁶ will react to proposed changes. The third aspect of the framework from the works of Pheysey, similar to Shien's theories on sub-cultures but further defining and subdividing into groups, indicate that the various sub-cultures within an organization, to include the cultural mosaic representing Canadian Society, will push and pull culture through changes based on the perspectives provided by each sub-culture.²⁰⁷ Therefore, change initiatives must reach across as many sub-cultures as possible to have the greatest chance of success. Unfortunately, the reality of organizational change is that these three different aspects make military culture unpredictable. The final aspect of the framework outlines the need for trust and confidence in the organization. Linked to the

²⁰⁴ Allan D. English, *Understanding Military Culture* ..., 18.

²⁰⁵ Allan D. English, *Understanding Military Culture* ..., 21.

²⁰⁶ Cristina Masters, "Bodies of Technology: Cyborg Soldiers and Militarized Masculinities," *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 7, no. 1 (2005): 117-119.

²⁰⁷ Allan D. English, *Understanding Military Culture* ..., 24.

unpredictability and vulnerability that members may experience as they go through culture change, these two elements are pre-requisite to any change occurring.

The first aspect of the framework from Schein is the sum of sub-cultures. Irregardless of Pheyseys culture types, the Canadian Army, Navy, and Air Force each have their own, very specific and defined sub-culture. In the case of the Canadian Army²⁰⁸ and Royal Canadian Navy,²⁰⁹ these are based on centuries of tradition rooted in the British military. Even the Royal Canadian Air Force drew on members, customs, traditions of the other services when it was created.²¹⁰ The Army's regimental system²¹¹ still maintains much of the influence on careers, especially junior leadership.²¹² Each regiment seeks to further its own candidates for positions outside its regiment. Another sub-culture within the army can be found within the primary reserve, where units seek to offer exciting and fulfilling part-time jobs in their communities, and rely on the interest of the local community for recruits. Both sub-cultures have their own influence on operations and the values of their members. Many of the initiatives outlined in chapter three can be perceived as forces-wide, influencing change across the whole of the CAF. Programs such as promotion board reform, total health and wellness, retention, and human resources strategies must not focus solely on the diverse groups of the CAF. As an example, special consideration could be best placed on persons who further diversity and inclusion vice solely on those within visible minorities. In a military that must transition away from militarized

²⁰⁸ Department of National Defence, "History and Heritage – Canadian Army History," last modified 16 March 2022 <https://www.canada.ca/en/army/corporate/history/history.html>

²⁰⁹ Department of National Defence, "Toward a Canadian Naval Service (1867-1914)," last modified 20 March 2018 <https://www.canada.ca/en/navy/services/history/naval-service-1910-2010/toward.html>

²¹⁰ Department of National Defence, "Royal Flying Corps Canada – Canada's first military pilot training program," last modified 29 March 2017 <https://www.canada.ca/en/air-force/services/history-heritage/royal-flying-corps-canada.html>

²¹¹ Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, *Dishonoured legacy...*, 124-125

²¹² Louise Arbour [External Review Authority], *Report of the...*, 261-265.

masculine values, these initiatives must also provide incentives for the traditional white, male, heterosexual soldier to continue within the organization with a set of values that will change over time.

If initiatives, policy changes, and education programs do not reach the militarized masculine-oriented majority, then a higher turnover in personnel could be expected.²¹³ From the second aspect of the framework, the interaction of current values-in-use with their environment, one can expect the current set of values-in-use of the majority to interact with culture change initiatives. Some culture members may not change, encouraging challenges to initiatives or higher turnover.²¹⁴ Current members who may have been otherwise capable of adapting their values in line with organizational change if they felt included in the process may be pushed further away, creating higher turnover for a CAF experiencing retention issues. In Arbour's external review, she reports on CAF members going along with initiatives inside military colleges,²¹⁵ a symptom of people who perhaps do not understand the problem or who have not felt included in the change initiatives. Another observation on culture from Pedersen and Sorensen is that cultures are not required to be coherent, consistent, or rational.²¹⁶ Though it may be logical that the CAF should become diverse and inclusive, a masculine mind that naturally seeks to dominate or control the world around it could feel subjugated by values that encourage it to be less masculine without seeing the opportunity for personal, professional, and organizational growth through the process. This conflict of values underscores the critical importance of

²¹³ Allan D. English, *Understanding Military Culture* ..., 21.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*,

²¹⁵ Louise Arbour [External Review Authority], *Report of the...*, 234.

²¹⁶ Allan D. English, *Understanding Military Culture* ..., 21.

education versus training in any attempts at organizational or cultural change; simply communicating initiatives to the masses might be counter-productive to lasting change.

The third aspect of the framework is that different cultures exist, and each culture prioritizes different values, which is crucial to how the CAF will evolve. Also associated with the third aspect of the framework is multiculturalism. Including perspectives from the various sub-cultures that now reside in Canada should not be based on the need to meet a quota or percentage of minorities. As described by business researcher from the Uppsala university in Sweden, Gundula Lücke, the varying perspectives provided through multiculturalism and how these cultures perceive the world around them provide unique perspectives on complex problems.²¹⁷ An example of diversity in thought can be seen in the different ways the services, army-navy-air force or other sub-cultures within the CAF, solve problems. These problem solving skills of the services are often a product of the service's specific socialization processes and sub-culture. If the CAF can harness these perspectives and encourage diversity in thought, they will become a force multiplier during operations.

Also included in the third aspect of the framework are the defined culture types. Common across most subcultures of the CAF, aspects of Pheysse's culture types can be observed. Role culture – conformity to superiors' expectations is emphasized and expected – and power culture – where strong people with high status direct the activities of subordinates who are expected to be compliant and willing²¹⁸ are the two most prevalent. Implementing change in these two different cultures again underscores the importance of education versus communication and training. Subordinates will require clear intentions at all levels –the external reviews, such as the

²¹⁷ Gundula Lücke, Tatiana Kostova, and Kendall Roth, "Multiculturalism from a Cognitive Perspective: Patterns and Implications," *Journal of International Business Studies* 45, no. 2 (Feb, 2014): 169-190.

²¹⁸ *ibid*, 25-26.

Deschamps report, have commented that challenges lay as much with officers as with non-commissioned officers and members.²¹⁹ The middle management of the CAF, the sergeants, warrant officers, lieutenants, captains, and majors need the tools and education to interact with the day to day challenges they will face with organizational change. If any subordinate in the chain does not understand the initiatives or feels left out, then the efficiency of the process will be diminished or stalled. Those leaders that manage and apply policies, as well as those who interact with large numbers of subordinates, such as the “missing-middle”²²⁰ must be provided the means to mentor and lead them effectively.

The final aspect associated with organizational change framework is confidence and trust in the organization. The events leading to the Somalia inquiry,²²¹ Deschamps independent review,²²² and Arbour independent review²²³ can be linked to demands of change and times when the Canadian public and members of the CAF have lost confidence in their military or its leadership. The recent interim analysis and recommendation²²⁴ made by Justice Arbour regarding temporarily transferring the investigation and prosecution of sexually related offences to the civilian system is an example. The initial reasoning for this measure, originally meant to be temporary but recommended to become permanent in the final report, aimed at rebuilding

²¹⁹ Marie Deschamps [External Review Authority], *External review...*, ii.

²²⁰ Murray Brewster, “Eyre blames sexual misconduct crisis, pandemic for shrinking military,” CBC news, last modified 26 October 2021, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/wayne-eyre-armed-forces-sexual-misconduct-pandemic-1.6224791#:~:text=%22And%20these%20are%20the%20heart%20of%20our%20command,the%20existential%20imperative%20of%20changing%20our%20internal%20culture.%22>

²²¹ Richard Foot, *Somalia Affair*, in the Canadian Encyclopedia, last modified 27 September 2019.

<https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/somalia-affair>

²²² N. Mercier and A. Castonguay, “Our Military’s Disgrace”, *Maclean’s*, last modified 16 May 2014, <https://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/our-militarys-disgrace/>

²²³ Kristy Kirkup and Janice Dickson, “Former Supreme Court justice Louise Arbour to review sexual harassment, misconduct in the military,” *The Globe and Mail*, last modified 29 April 2021, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-former-supreme-court-justice-louise-arbour-to-review-sexual-harassment/>

²²⁴ Louise Arbour [External Review Authority], *Interim recommendations ...*, 2.

members' confidence in their perception of justice by ensuring independence in investigative and prosecutive process. Encouraging confidence from CAF members and the public will demand significant reforms to the military justice system, disciplinary, and administrative processes. Building trust in all members of the CAF and Canadian society will require transparency, honesty, and communication.²²⁵

Current initiatives touch on all aspects of the framework positively, from pay equity, to changes in the QR&Os, to indigenous knowledge and learning, and even to revisions of dress policies. The sheer amount of initiatives and the fact that they are aimed at all aspects of the CAF will challenge the status quo and arguably encourage review and changes to all aspects of the CAF as an organization. The potential for organizational change is real; however, the unknown aspect – how current culture and values-in-use will react to proposed change – will determine the efficacy of current change efforts. In order to favourably influence current culture, leadership must move beyond briefings in town halls. Subordinates that have been socialized into a militarized masculine military must now buy into change and be convinced that there is nothing wrong with vulnerability. Initiatives must include educational opportunities, such as those recommended by Scoppio,²²⁶ which will not only allow leaders to understand but allow for a shift in the military culture away from power and role cultures.

Section 2: Areas for Leadership to Focus

The CAF is an organization unlike any other in many ways; however, like other government departments, it has a finite amount of personnel and resources. The CAF's credibility among the Canadian population and the credibility of senior leadership among CAF

²²⁵ Ashley C. Fulmer, and M.J. Gelfand, "At What Level (and in Whom) We Trust...; 1185.

²²⁶ Grazia Scoppio, "If you build it, they will come: ...; 76

members may have been tarnished, especially regarding the various scandals over the past few years.²²⁷ As such, the primacy of action towards organizational change has been elevated. This section aims to identify areas where leaders can focus their actions and efforts to influence change in a positive light. These areas indicate where change efforts may fall short and are not exhaustive. They stem from the analysis of observations common to the various external reviews as well as recurring themes through the application of the framework to the initiatives. The areas defined below are intended to supplement the current initiatives and encourage further reflection from CAF leadership at all levels.

The important role of leadership has been identified in various sections throughout this paper, demonstrated through the plethora of references to reports and independent reviews regarding CAF culture.²²⁸ Therefore, it behooves leaders to consider the impacts that they bring upon culture change initiatives. One of the primary roles of a leader includes understanding their subordinates, leaders must accept that much of the CAF has been socialized into a culture of militarized masculinity, and demanding change forces many to feel vulnerable. This understanding will assist leaders in aiding their members through the creative aspects of organizational change and cultural-cognitive influence. Considered as a supplement, and perhaps a prerequisite, to the various initiatives and an inclusive environment, the conditions must be met for members to challenge their own militarized masculine values ingrained in the CAF socialization methods for decades.

²²⁷ Murray Brewster, “Case against former top General Jonathan Vance...,” and Ashley Burke, “A military in crisis: Here are the senior leaders embroiled in sexual misconduct cases,” CBC News, last updated 20 Apr 2022. <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/sexual-misconduct-military-senior-leaders-dnd-caf-1.6218683>

²²⁸ Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, *Dishonoured legacy...*, 39, Marie Deschamps [External Review Authority], *External review...*, 86-87, and Louise Arbour [External Review Authority], *Report of the...*, 192.

Senior leaders are not the only leaders requiring credibility and whom have an important role in the organization. Those in the “missing-middle” must avoid passing responsibility onto senior leaders that many of their subordinates do not recognize as part of their culture.²²⁹ In a military where officers make up only one quarter of its effective strength, the missing middle’s impact on the masses cannot be understated. One sergent or lieutenant can reach more soldiers through informal training than a mandated, “death-by-PowerPoint,” training lecture. The author acknowledges the difficult balancing act for CAF leaders between fulfilling commitments made by the Government of Canada, both at home and abroad, and the need for leaders to be present within their units. However, when these ranks end up managing more than their share of the organization because of absences of colleagues, the quality of management is reduced, responsibilities grow, and time to mentor shrinks.²³⁰ Not only would the lack of leaders cause the implementation of work-related training to be difficult, with many corporals taking on the responsibilities of sergents, the addition of any culture-change educational initiatives would be severely impeded. Reduction in tempo of the middle management requires serious consideration and analysis.

A second area to focus is re-building the credibility of the CAF and its leadership. Though this may take some time, it can be reinforced through actions encouraging transparency. The recent interim report from Justice Arbour is a prime example.²³¹ In her recommendation to

²²⁹ During his sub-unit command in late winter early spring 2021, when the number of allegations towards CAF senior leadership was at its height, the author met with groups of junior leaders and their subordinates to discuss these events. Many at the rank of sergent and below expressed that they were too far detached from the senior leadership and that generals seemed to be a separate culture. They reported that such allegations would have had an impact only if they had been made against their warrant officers, sergent-majors, captains or commanding officers.

²³⁰ To provide an example, the author was a sub-unit commander for almost three years in a unit belonging to 5e *Groupe Brigade Mécanisé du Canada* between November 2018 and August 2021. During this time, the sub-unit experienced prolonged periods where 60 soldiers, normally led by a team of six sergents, three warrant officers, and five lieutenant-captains found themselves being led, mentored and trained by one-one-two respectively. Similar realities were experienced by other sub-units across the brigade.

²³¹ Louise Arbour [External Review Authority], *Interim recommendations ...*, 2.

temporarily transfer sexual misconduct-related cases to civilian authorities, she offers that though civilian authorities do not possess “the appropriate level of understanding and knowledge of the military,” the need for credibility and trust is paramount. Though the recommendation in the final report is to indefinitely maintain these cases with civilian authorities to ensure no overlap of jurisdiction,²³² the intent of the interim measure placed credibility and trust above understanding until such a time that the Military Justice System had proven able to encourage trust in its handling of such cases through various recommended reforms.²³³

Also associated with credibility and offered for consideration is the transition from a CAF led culture change organization to one led by an independent organization. CPCC has gone great lengths to encourage, develop, and lead initiatives for culture change and this recommendation is not based on the immeasurable efforts already carried out by the organization. Instead, this recommendation stems from the socialization of all CAF members and the nature of CAF organizational culture, to which the military members of CPCC belong. All military members have been socialized into CAF culture, with many having careers defined by fitting the one-path described by Taber.²³⁴ As an insider to the CAF, and one equally socialized into the organization, the author posits that individual members are able to be objective, however this viewpoint may not be shared with many outsiders to the organization. Those already socialized into the CAF are familiar with the sacred aspects of CAF culture, those beliefs and values that define the organization, however are less likely to challenge them since they are at the core of what has defined their environment for years. To truly evaluate all aspects of culture and build programs or initiatives to challenge its essence, an organization led by persons not subjected to the

²³² Louise Arbour [External Review Authority], *Report of the...*, 100-103

²³³ Louise Arbour [External Review Authority], *Interim recommendations ...*, 2

²³⁴ Nancy Taber, “Eliminating unearned privilege...”, 50-51

socialization of the CAF could prove beneficial. Such an organization with academic and military advisors, could direct the CAF towards uncharted territory and challenge aspects of culture that have resisted influence over the last quarter century. Arguments similar to those for transitioning the investigation and prosecution of CAF sexually related complaints from Arbour's interim report could be made for both sides;²³⁵ a Military led organization would master the understanding of the workings of current culture and possibly bolster support from military members, while an organization with leadership independent from military socialization would lend credibility in the eyes of society and force the military to explain and justify the workings of many of its processes, thus challenging the status quo. Achieving both aims simultaneously may be difficult for such an organization, and the choice of leader certainly would send a message as to the priorities of senior leadership.

The third element for CAF leadership to focus on is education. Every report analyzed in this paper has included recommendations for changes to the training or education systems within the CAF. The importance of education cannot be understated. Scoppio distinguishes between education and training,²³⁶ with education having the preferred impact on values and beliefs. The importance is apparent when considering the criteria for cultural-cognitive change adapted to the military culture.²³⁷ In order to inform new beliefs and creativity, education must be considered, adapted, and emplaced across all ranks. The inclusion, diversity, equity, and accountability education proposed by Scoppio can potentially influence militarized masculinity and its corresponding values-in-use throughout the CAF in a positive way. Such a program would be designed to challenge personal bias and inform CAF members on various important subjects

²³⁵ Louise Arbour [External Review Authority], *Interim recommendations ...*, 2.

²³⁶ Grazia Scoppio, "If you build it, they will come...", 82.

²³⁷ Vanessa Brown and Allan Okros, "Shifting the Spotlight... 12.

such as harassment, discrimination, racism, intersectionality, misconduct, and culture. The instructor cadre leading such a program is equally as important as the material; qualified instructors for theoretical lessons and CAF members assisting in leading discussions and applying theory could provide credible.

Since the CAF has been heavily communicating and constantly addressing culture change since at least 2015, change fatigue must also be considered by those managing organizational change. Change fatigue is defined as “the perception that too much change is taking place, accompanied by an overwhelming feeling of exhaustion, stress and even burnout brought on by rapid and continuous changes in the workplace.”²³⁸ It can result from poorly managed organizational change or when repeated initiatives are introduced without time for recovery or stability to be returned to the organization.²³⁹ In an organization such as the CAF, stability is difficult to attain. On 31 May 2022, the CAF announced 29 General Officer or Flag Officer (GOFO) retirements and 50 GOFO positions that would see change in the coming year.²⁴⁰ These changes are beyond the previously announced new commanders of the three elements, the Army, the Royal Canadian Navy, and the Royal Canadian Airforce. In a military with just over 100 GOFOs, many departments have been thrust back into the storming phases of team building.

Equally dangerous to organizational change efforts is the related topic of change cynicism. Put into context for CAF organizational and cultural change initiatives, change cynicism refers to pessimism of CAF members that could surround the success of proposed

²³⁸ Noufou Ouedraogo and Mohammed Laid Ouakouak, "Antecedents and Outcome of Employee Change Fatigue and Change Cynicism," *Journal of Organizational Change Management* 34, no. 1 (2021): 159-160. <https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/antecedents-outcome-employee-change-fatigue/docview/2533533521/se-2?accountid=9867>.

²³⁹ *ibid*, 162.

²⁴⁰ Department of National Defence, “Promotions, Senior Appointments and Retirements (amendment 1) 2022 – General officers / Flag officers” (Ottawa, CANFORGEN 078/22, 311952Z May 2022).

changes. This type of cynicism could occur if leadership does not adequately address change to the masses, and education attempts fail to give perspective to those who are being asked to change.²⁴¹ Linking back to the presence of leadership, the stability of the organization is also affected by the presence of leaders. When the acting-lacking²⁴² leader changes, or even through the natural turn over and rotation of leaders in the CAF, the sub-units, units, and small organizations within it are also thrown into instability until the new leader is integrated into the group. This constant lack of stability, combined with a lack of education by leaders that are absent, can set the conditions for both change fatigue and change cynicism.

This section provided three critical areas and a consideration for CAF leaders to include in their reflection. Leaders must remember that the current values-in-use are a form of militarized masculinity – CAF socialization have forced these values on its members from the day they enter basic training. Leaders must also be present to guide members as they continue on the path to organizational change through transformational or similar leadership methods based on growth. Credibility and trust are essential; the CAF must continue to take ownership of its challenges – processes need to change, and systems need to demonstrate their viability to address a changing culture which can be achieved through transparency and honesty. Cultural-cognitive change in beliefs must be addressed through education and the ability for CAF members to grow beyond PowerPoint slides while leaders are present to guide and mentor. Finally special attention must be directed towards change management – ensuring that members do not become fatigued to change – and ensuring that change management does not become the management of uncontrolled or undesired change. To aid the CAF in further evaluating, managing, and ensuring

²⁴¹ *ibid*, 163.

²⁴² In military terms, acting lacking refers to a member that has been assigned a role as leader, but who lacks the prerequisite training, rank, or experience.

the continuity of organizational change, senior leaders need to evaluate shifting the responsibility for CAF organizational culture change to a group that is independent and untouched by CAF socialization against the need to understand and apply culture change. Irregardless of the outcome of any decisions that leadership may face, a message will be sent to the CAF and to the society it serves.

Section 3: Areas for future study and development

Throughout the writing of this paper, several subjects were found to be beyond the scope of research or worthy of further study. Those already mentioned were the study of individual sub-cultures within the CAF and their effect on organizational change and the study of the CAF Junior Officer Development Program. This final section will offer and explain other areas that stemmed from analysis but were not yet stated. The following three topics could provide further insight into CAF organizational change and perhaps fall under a category of core values that some may consider outside the scope of organizational change. This section will demonstrate that there is room for improvement and that even some of the most sacred aspects of military culture may provide positive cultural change.

One of the central tenants of military culture is discipline. It guides how members dress, interact, and could be argued by some to be central in preparation for battle. As already identified by Justice Arbour, the CAF's military justice system's concurrent jurisdiction over Criminal Code offenses aims to maintain discipline, however it seems to have failed to achieve its desired objectives.²⁴³ Going beyond the National Defence Act, investigations, and prosecution of sexual misconduct-related charges, the military justice system could revisit how it applies discipline in

²⁴³ Louise Arbour [External Review Authority], *Report of the...* 62

the day-to-day. Some initiatives regarding beard and hair regulations have been published as temporary Canadian Forces General Messages²⁴⁴ (CANFORGEN) and are expected to be published in the upcoming update to the CAF dress manual. Though very much regulative in nature, their application in the day-to-day becomes normative but may not be enough to address current norms adequately. Many CAF traditions are associated with discipline, and arguably chief among them is parade drill. Parade drill aims to influence discipline in combat, though this relationship requires further evaluation. Perhaps parade drill is not required for all soldiers? Perhaps other influences on soldier discipline may prove more effective?

A second recommendation for further study is centred around professional development. As initially indicated in the Somalia Report, the CAF controls all aspects of its training and education systems. JCSP is an example of how the CAF dictates its processes. Approximately one hundred CAF majors partake in this course, where the CAF maintains final approval on all subject matter. Though students who elect to conduct the associated master's in defence studies have aspects of their program managed by the academics of RMC, students are pooled into classes with their fellow officers. Individuals are encouraged to think beyond the military, however, military group-think remains the same since members often share similar values due to military socialization and educational process'. This group-think in the CAF's military institutions naturally finds its way into the daily lives of students even though free thought is encouraged. In the author's experience at the CFC, it can be observed in many different aspects of student interaction.²⁴⁵ To broaden the diversity of thought of officers across the CAF, further

²⁴⁴ Department of National Defence, *Amendment to Beard Policy*, (Ottawa, CANFORGEN 158/18, 251819Z September 2018).

²⁴⁵ As an example, in the preparation of presentations on recommendations to CAF systems, colleagues have advised others not to recommend a certain change because it wouldn't be accepted. On a different subject, colleagues advised to concentrate on other, more simple problems, and not waste effort on ideas that are complex or possibly

study could be invested in the feasibility of having officers complete the academic portion of the JCSP through partnered civilian universities across Canada. At the end of the academic portion, these students could then come together to cover subject matter strictly related to military operations. This approach is similar to recommendation #29 in Justice Arbour's report but centred on post graduate learning vice her assessment regarding undergraduate learning at RMC.²⁴⁶ A senior leader at the CFC has repeatedly informed students that the most crucial aspect of the program is not the course material but the experiences and relations built while at the college. The author agrees that the university experience is the most critical aspect; however, he disagrees that this experience should be held in a military forum. The university experience of officers at civilian universities across Canada would encourage thinking that is perhaps divergent from CAF group think or, at the very least, offer perspectives that students would not usually enjoy while at the college. It would also provide these leaders the opportunity to speak and explain many of the challenges of military employment, further developing links with Canadian society.

The author's final recommendation for further study is intended to supplement the GBA+ workshop on curriculum redevelopment. GBA+ is often regarded as an addition at the end of a planning process; however, in so doing, the program does not realize its full potential.²⁴⁷ GBA+ intends to change how military planners perceive problems and build potential solutions,²⁴⁸ not

too in depth to be considered. In informal settings at the mess or in hallway discussions, officers question the requirements and credibility of external reviews but rarely take an objective look at the observations of these reports.

²⁴⁶ Louise Arbour [External Review Authority], *Report of the...*, 233-234.

²⁴⁷ During a orders group, the author recalls an infantry officer sarcastically implying that GBA+ had been "checked off" when a colleague offered considerations for displaced women and children during a mock training scenario. When seeking guidance on how to address the issue from a superior, the author was advised to ignore it and that he was not going to change the Army.

²⁴⁸ Government of Canada, "What is Gender-based Analysis Plus," Government of Canada, last modified 14 April 2021. <https://women-gender-equality.canada.ca/en/gender-based-analysis-plus/what-gender-based-analysis-plus.html>

simply adapt a solution to gender considerations. Therefore, the redevelopment of the GBA+ curriculum needs to revisit how GBA+ is employed in problem framing at the operational level at a minimum. Planning processes, such as the Operational Planning Process taught to students at the CFC, could incorporate GBA+ as a step parallel to other analysis like the enemy analysis conducted in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield stage. The lead for GBA+ should not be automatically placed as a responsibility of an officer on the periphery of planning but a lead planning or operator.²⁴⁹ Further study could be conducted in preparation for this curriculum redevelopment to develop recommendations on better incorporating GBA+ into military operations, to include a study to officially change the doctrine associated with this process. As a supplement to GBA+ in the JCSP curriculum, the ideas of GBA+ could be included in a course on diversity and gender studies which would be considered core curriculum material instead of being an optional, electable course.

Though the topics offered in this section are not exhaustive, these recommendations provide further areas of study that could inform CAF organizational change. The CAF has deep roots in tradition, from how it dresses to how it educates its members. Though perhaps initially identified as absurd, these areas of study seek to challenge the understanding of CAF members who have been socialized into the military and have adopted a ‘military as a way of life’ mantra. The aim of these studies should start by addressing the need or requirement for changes, since changes to these elements are suggestions intended to provoke thought, analysis and reflection, and therefore may not be required given broader organizational change efforts. Organizational change in the CAF, where many processes or ways of thinking have existed for over half a

²⁴⁹ Andrew Jewer, “INCORPORATING GENDER PERSPECTIVES INTO PLANNING,” (Joint Command and Staff Course Briefing note, Canadian Forces College, 2022)

century, will require drastic measures to challenge them. In the mid 1960s, many in the CAF thought that unification of the services would destroy individual element culture and subsequently caused revolt and many officers resigned from service.²⁵⁰ A former MND, Paul Hellyer, and some of those supporting unification believed that unification would result in members redirecting their loyalties to the unified service away from their individual branches.²⁵¹ Experts have called unification a crisis of civil-military relations and a struggle for the government to gain further control over its armed forces.²⁵² Irregardless of the reasons for or against change, reform was demanded by its governing body, the democratically elected government of Canada, and was subsequently carried out. Though perhaps circumstances are different, the change demanded by Canadians through their government will force the CAF to change, either through internally controlled change or through legislated change external to the forces. Leaders must reflect on how they can be agents of change to influence CAF organizational culture before they lose the ability to influence and shape it.

²⁵⁰ Daniel Gosselin, "The Storm over Unification of the Armed Forces: A Crisis of Canadian Civil-Military Relations." In *The Insubordinate and the Noncompliant*, ed Howard Coombs (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2007). 312

²⁵¹ Daniel Gosselin, "Hellyer's Ghosts: Unification of The Canadian Forces is 40 Years Old – Part Two. Canadian Military Journal 9, 3 (2009): 12.

²⁵² Daniel Gosselin, "The Storm over Unification of the Armed Forces....", 309-310.

CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION

“If you don’t like change, you’re going to like irrelevance a lot less.”

— General Eric K. Shinseki, 34th Chief of Staff, US Army

This paper aimed to study CAF culture change initiatives as part of a greater organizational change. The methodology of study sought consultations with various groups deemed to have major influences on CAF organizational culture and the ensuing efforts of change. Supporting information was provided to this study by the CDA, CMP, and the Director Training and Education, CPCC. Though consultations with other directorates within CPCC did not provide information regarding change initiatives or regarding culture change campaign planning, the author did gather enough information via other sources to conduct his analysis. The author suspects that the requested information from CPCC would have amplified the end result and provided further credibility to both this study’s findings and CPCC’s culture change efforts.

The framework and definitions chapter of this paper set out to establish the building blocks of culture. First, it offered military culture as a natural counterculture to mainstream culture, in which the needs of the many outweigh the need of the individual. Next, it defined the building blocks of culture, including beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviours, to include how they influence each other. It described the current CAF culture and ethos and demonstrated its evolution since its first conception in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It continued with an elaboration on this paper’s framework, based on the works of English,²⁵³ and underscoring the impacts of sub-culture. This framework first drew on Schein’s theories of sub-cultures and the link to success through initiatives reaching across these subordinate parts of the greater CAF culture. The second element of the framework focused on Pedersen and Sorensen’s theories on

²⁵³ Allan D. English, *Understanding Military Culture ...*,

values-in-use²⁵⁴ and the chaotic nature of culture which reacts to its environment. Also credited to Pedersen and Sorensen is the heightened influence of certain sub-cultures on the bigger organizational culture as well as natural resistance to change and certain elements of the culture not fully accepting change.²⁵⁵ The third element of the framework, based on the works of Pheysey²⁵⁶ and research by Lücke,²⁵⁷ elaborated on the growing importance of multi-culturalism in organizations, and further established the CAF as a mix of role-culture and power-culture. The final aspect of the framework, trust and confidence in the organization and the initiatives, was identified as an element central to an organizational change effort. Chapter two concluded by demonstrating that the CAF has two distinct cultures; the first described by doctrine and the second described by the values-in-use of the CAF, notably in sync with its traditional militarized masculine culture, passed on through socialization into the organization beginning with basic training.

Chapter three set out to define the current situation of CAF organizational culture and the initiatives to change it. Initially applied to the CAF by Brown and Okros, the institutional change model of Scott was elaborated to demonstrate the three facets of change – Regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive.²⁵⁸ This chapter then elaborated on the various Somalia report and independent reviews. Of note, the Somalia report elaborated on CAF culture and underlined the importance of training,²⁵⁹ the Deschamps report underscored a sexualized culture within the CAF,²⁶⁰ the Heyder-Beattie summary offered three recommendations to assist the CAF with its

²⁵⁴ Jesper Strandgaard Pedersen, *Organizational Cultures in Theory and Practice*, (Aldershot: Avebury, 1989), 21.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*,

²⁵⁶ Allan D. English, Understanding Military Culture, A Canadian Perspective, 25-26

²⁵⁷ Gundula Lücke, Tatiana Kostova, and Kendall Roth, "Multiculturalism from a Cognitive Perspective: Patterns and Implications," *Journal of International Business Studies* 45, no. 2 (Feb, 2014): 169-190.

²⁵⁸ Vanessa Brown and Allan Okros, "Shifting the Spotlight...", 11-12

²⁵⁹ Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, *Dishonoured legacy...*, 22-24

²⁶⁰ Marie Deschamps [External Review Authority], External review into sexual misconduct ..., 14

cultural evolution,²⁶¹ and the Arbour report built on addressing the negative aspects of CAF culture to include its sexualized nature.²⁶² The chapter then summarized some current and planned key initiatives from the CAF for organizational change. It concluded by elaborating on training and education as essential parts of organizational change. This final section on education elaborated on formal and informal training and the importance of professional military education that could take advantage of diversity in thought to change cultural-cognitive processes.

Chapter four matched the various ways of influencing organizational culture to the various change initiatives in section three of the previous chapter. It demonstrated that many key initiatives were spread across all three change facets: regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive. It then provided three fault lines drawn from common observations from the various reports – offering areas where leadership could ensure synchronization between efforts and resources to provide greater chances of success. Before summarizing with recommended areas for further study, the concepts of change fatigue and change cynicism were briefly addressed. Areas for future development include going beyond the military justice system and evaluating how the CAF applies discipline, how professional development is approached at the middle management level and finally, through upcoming GBA+ curriculum workshops, how GBA+ is applied to operational planning.

This paper sought to demonstrate that current CAF culture change initiatives are conducive to organizational change; however, to become lasting, policies and approaches must be further adapted to include more sub-cultures within the CAF. Through the adapted

²⁶¹ Maya Eichler, “*Redesigning the CAF workplace ...*”; Grazia Scoppio, “If you build it, they will come: ...”; and Nancy Taber, “Eliminating unearned privilege....”.

²⁶² Louise Arbour [External Review Authority], *Report of the Independent...*.

framework, and the subsequent analysis of initiatives, many of which address the challenges facing change identified through the various reports on CAF culture, this paper has demonstrated that current culture change initiatives touch on all facets of change. Many of these change initiatives have addressed the lack of diversity within the CAF; however, little evidence was provided of initiatives addressing the militarized masculine culture already within the CAF, such as those found in the Heyder-Beattie final settlement. Though this militarized masculine culture is acknowledged by many experts in the various reports, it seems that culture change initiatives only indirectly address it by introducing other values. This approach could perhaps explain natural resistance to organizational and cultural change, providing great cynicism, doubt, and resistance by members of the CAF that have been facing culture change for over five years. Initiatives such as those included in the Heyder-Beattie settlement aim to challenge the current assumptions held by CAF members, and through the three different influences of CAF culture, attempt to change their ideas, beliefs, and values.

As closing comments, the author offers that perhaps the path to true inclusion and diversity begins by defining values stemming from traditional masculine and feminine cultures, not simply adding diverse groups and genders. The sacred values, based in the militarized masculine culture that has dictated how wars have been fought for decades, may not be required to be completely abandoned. One must not forget that one of the goals of a military is to apply violence on behalf of its government, and that many masculine values have important roles in how war is fought. Equally as important is for more traditionally feminine values to be given a chance to impact warfighting; diplomacy, a value often associated with femininity, may reduce the scale and intensity of armed conflict. The divergence between values-in-use and written values will always exist, and must be continuously managed – organizational culture change is a

continuous process since cultures will always evolve. The importance is having a balance, highs and lows, to avoid change fatigue and ensure that the divergence between values-in-use and written values is minimal.

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